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DISSING CONGRESS
© Ruth Colker* and James J. Brudney**
My Court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to the Court with
the presumption of constitutionality. That presumption reflects
Congress's status as a coequal branch of government with its own
responsibilities to the Constitution. But if Congress is going to take the
attitude that it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme
Court worry about the Constitution... then perhaps that presumption is
unwarranted.1 - Justice Antonin Scalia
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist's recent leader-
ship has invalidated numerous federal laws, arguably departing from
settled precedent to do so. The Rehnquist Court2 has held that
Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in five instances during
the 2000-01 Term,3 on four occasions during the 1999-2000 Term4 and
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1. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speaking at the Telecommu-
nications Law and Policy Symposium (Apr. 18, 2000). See A Shot from Justice Scalia, WASH.
POST, May 2, 2000, at A-22 (quoting passage but omitting second sentence). We transcribed
the entire quotation, including the second sentence, from a videotape loaned to us by the
Law Review of Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. The Law Review was a
cosponsor of the symposium at which Justice Scalia spoke.
2. Our argument focuses on the Rehnquist Court since the 1994-95 Term, following the
retirements of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. In this Article, we refer to the
"Rehnquist Court" to mean the Court in its last seven Terms, through 2000-01.
3. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as applied to the States; 5-4 vote); Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (1996 funding restriction in Legal Services Corporation Act;
5-4 vote); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001) (application of federal wiretapping
statute to third parties' publication of intercepted conversations; 6-3 vote); United States v.
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in a total of twenty-nine cases since the 1994-95 Term.5 Commentators
typically explain these decisions in federalism terms, focusing on the
Court's use of its power to protect the States from an overreaching
Congress.6
That explanation is incomplete and, in important respects, unper-
suasive. The Rehnquist Court has not been as solicitous of states'
Hatter, 121 S. Ct. 1782 (2001) (Social Security tax as applied to Article III judges; 5-4 vote);
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001) (assessment imposed on private
industry by Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act; 6-3 vote).
4. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (congressional attempt to over-
ride "Miranda warnings"; 7-2 vote); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S.
803 (2000) (regulation of sexually explicit channels on cable; 5-4 vote); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (the private right of action under the Violence Against
Women Act; 5-4 vote); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, as applied to the States; 5-4 vote). In this Article, we focus in par-
ticular on the decisions in Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett as reflecting a trend in the Court's
developing methodology for considering the constitutionality of Congress's actions.
5. The remaining twenty cases in which the Court invalidated federal legislation since
1994 include the following ten cases which we will discuss in this Article: Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (FLSA as applied to States; 5-4 vote); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark Act as applied to the
States; 5-4 vote); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999) (Patent Act as applied to the States; 5-4 vote); Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417 (1998) (line item veto; 6-3 vote); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Act
requiring that local law enforcement officers conduct background checks; 5-4 vote); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (Communications Decency Act; 7-2 vote); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act; 6-3 vote); Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; 5-4 vote); Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (federal practice encouraging contractors to hire sub-
contractors based on race-conscious criteria; 5-4 vote); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (Gun-Free School Zones Act; 5-4 vote). The ten additional cases not discussed in this
Article are: Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (Act
prohibiting broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino gambling; 9-0 vote); E. Enter. v. Ap-
fel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act; 5-4 vote); United States
v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998) (Harbor Maintenance Tax; 9-0 vote);
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997) (Indian Land Consolidation Act; 8-1 vote); Denver
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act; 6-3 vote); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (Federal Election Campaign Act; 7-2
vote); United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996) (Section 4371 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code; 6-2 vote); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (Federal Alcohol
Administration Act; 9-0 vote); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (§ 27A(b)
of Securities Exchange Act; 7-2 vote); United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513
U.S. 454 (1995) (Ethics in Government Act; 6-3 vote).
6. See, e.g., Mitchell S. Lustig, Rehnquist Court Redefines the Commerce Clause,
N.Y.L.J. 1, 4 (Aug. 28, 2000) ("[I]nstead of employing its activist tendencies in the name of
economic due process, the new mantra of the Rehnquist Court appears to be the Tenth
Amendment and States' Rights"); Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel, Supreme Court Wrap-
Up: U.S. Supreme Court 1999-2000 Term Review, 161 N.J. L.J. 709 (Aug. 14, 2000) (reporting
on the Court's aggressive policing of Congress as "part of a 35- to 40-year trend, one that
stems from 'direct attacks on state sovereignty' "). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Principle
and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sover-
eign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953 (2000); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Feder-
alism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1996); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Feder-
alism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
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rights as one might expect if it were operating primarily from a feder-
alism perspective. Even apart from its highly controversial foray into
Florida election law,7 the Court in recent years has not been shy about
invalidating state statutes or governmental actions based on its own
conception of what federal power or federal limits require.' Moreover,
7. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Although a discussion of Bush v. Gore is be-
yond the scope of this Article, we note that one might view the Court as having decided the
Florida election dispute at least in part in order to avoid having that dispute resolved by the
United States Congress. Bush v. Gore would then constitute a sixth decision in the 2000
Term that had the result of expanding the role of the Court at the expense of Congress.
Compare Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 650-53 (2001) (ar-
guing that federal statutory intent and political question considerations strongly supported
allowing the 2000 presidential election to be ultimately resolved by democratically elected
branches of government), with John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 775, 789-90 (2001) (arguing that Court's intervention saved the country from having
election ultimately decided through a "destructive partisan struggle" on the floor of
Congress).
8. In the 1999 Term, the Rehnquist Court struck down state statutes or government ac-
tions fourteen times, along with the four invalidated national laws mentioned in footnote 4,
supra. Two or more of the Justices who most often vote to invalidate federal laws joined the
majority in thirteen of those cases. We refer to Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas,
O'Connor, and Kennedy as most inclined to challenge actively the work of Congress based
on the separation of powers perspective adopted in this Article. The thirteen state law cases
in which some or all of these Justices voted to invalidate state statutes include, for example:
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that New Jersey's public accommo-
dations law, as applied to the Boy Scouts, violated the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of
expressive association; 5-4 majority included all five Justices identified above); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that student-led, student-initiated in-
vocations prior to football games, which were permissible under school district's policy, were
impermissibly coercive under the First Amendment; 6-3 majority included Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (invalidating a Washington
grandparents' rights statute; 6-3 majority included Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and
O'Connor); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (holding that a Texas statute altering the
legal rules of evidence and requiring less evidence to obtain conviction was impermissible ex
post facto law as applied to obtain a conviction; 5-4 majority included Justices Scalia and
Thomas); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (holding that Hawaii Constitution's restric-
tions on eligibility to vote for specific state agency violated Fifteenth Amendment; 7-2 ma-
jority included all five Justices identified above); Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
528 U.S. 458 (2000) (holding that California's rules for taxing its share of multistate corpora-
tions' income violated Due Process and Commerce Clauses by impermissibly taxing income
outside State's jurisdictional reach; 9-0 majority included all five Justices identified above).
In the 2000 Term, in addition to intervening to resolve the Florida election dispute in
Bush v. Gore, the Rehnquist Court struck down eleven state statutes or government actions
along with the five national laws identified in footnote 3, supra. Two or more of the Justices
who most often vote to invalidate federal laws joined the majority in all eleven of these deci-
sions. See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001) (holding that Missouri ballot regulation
violated the Elections Clause of Article I; 9-0 vote); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S.
Ct. 2404 (2001) (invalidating Massachusetts smoking regulations on preemption and First
Amendment grounds; 6-3 majority included all five Justices identified above); Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that state hospital's urine testing and re-
porting program violated Fourth Amendment; 6-3 majority included Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor); Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001) (invalidating
school's regulation of private Christian organization on free speech grounds; 6-3 majority
included all five Justices identified above); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (hold-
ing that Washington statute regulating life insurance and retirement proceeds was pre-
empted by ERISA; 7-2 majority included all five Justices identified above); Shafer v. South
Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (holding that state jury instruction in death penalty case vio-
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while it is true that many federal laws invalidated since 1995 have in-
volved assertedly unjustified intrusions on state interests, one cannot
adequately understand this recent judicial activism toward Congress
without employing a separation of powers perspective.
In acting repeatedly to invalidate federal legislation, the Court is
using its authority to diminish the proper role of Congress. Structur-
ally, the new activist majority has treated the federal legislative proc-
ess as akin to agency or lower court decisionmaking; in doing so, the
Court has undermined Congress's ability to decide for itself how and
whether to create a record in support of pending legislation. Substan-
tively, the Court has limited Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause9 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; it may ulti-
mately constrain Congress's power under the Spending Clause as
well.1' By diminishing Congress's capacity to address what Congress
lated right to due process; 7-2 majority included Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and
O'Connor).
This evidence that the five Justices referred to above have been so willing to invalidate
state laws or policies casts doubt on whether the Rehnquist Court's activism in invalidating
Congressional action can be best explained in federalism terms. One might well expect a
Court that is protective of state sovereignty when Congress seeks to regulate States' conduct
to adopt a comparably respectful position when the federal judiciary is asked to invalidate
state action. See generally John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the
1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27 (1998). We do not, however, assume that the Court should neces-
sarily use the same methodology when reviewing the constitutionality of state and federal
legislation. See infra note 169 and text accompanying notes 58-65, 90-97. Whether the cur-
rent Court's record of invalidating state governmental action reflects disrespect for the work
of the political branches of state government is beyond the scope of this Article.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"). Between 1937
and 1995, the Court did not invalidate any federal legislation on the basis that Congress ex-
ceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding federal statute as within Congress's Commerce Clause
powers), with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating federal statute as not
within Congress's Commerce Clause powers). Since 1995, the Court has invalidated two fed-
eral laws on the basis that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause, and
additional laws may soon be declared unconstitutional on that basis. For further discussion,
see infra Part I.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the power "to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article"). Between 1883 and 1997, the Court did not in-
validate any federal legislation on the basis that Congress exceeded its power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), with
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Since 1997, the Court has invalidated five fed-
eral laws on the basis that Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For further discussion, see infra Part I.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States .... "). For an argument that the Court should re-
interpret its Spending Clause jurisprudence to reflect stronger federalism principles, see
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995).
The constitutional cases discussed at infra Parts II & III are not the only evidence of the
Court's increasing irreverence towards Congress. For example, the decision in Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), applied an especially stringent "sub-constitutional" clear
statement rule to conclude that Congress had not intended to regulate certain state employ-
October 2001]
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identifies as national problems, the Rehnquist Court is effectively us-
ing the Commerce Clause and Section 5 to circumvent the reasoning if
not the holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity.
1 2
Justice Scalia himself has explained the Court's activism in separa-
tion of powers terms, maintaining that the Court's invalidation of fed-
eral legislation is appropriate because Congress has an "attitude."' 3
Many of the invalidated statutes, however, were passed with broad bi-
partisan support by a legislature that was far from confrontational to-
ward the Court, during periods in which Congress would have had lit-
tle reason to think it was passing arguably unconstitutional
legislation. 4 Moreover, there is evidence that even when Congress
ees. Although the Court crafted that rule in federalism terms, its approach is consistent with
the "disrespecting Congress" theme of this Article. The Gregory Court in 1991 imposed a
new standard on Congress, demanding absolute congressional clarity in text from a 1974
statute enacted in a very different era of judicial expectations. In Part II, we discuss this phe-
nomenon as part of a "crystal ball" problem. See also Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) (relying in part on Commerce Clause limits imposed on
Congress in 1995 through the Lopez decision to hold that a 1972 provision of the Clean Wa-
ter Act did not clearly authorize regulation of certain intrastate activities as substantially af-
fecting interstate commerce).
12. 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), and holding that the Court has "no license to employ freestanding conceptions of
state sovereignty" based on the Tenth Amendment when resolving conflicts between con-
gressional authority and assertions of states' interests). For further discussion, see infra Part
III.
13. See supra note 1. The Washington Post story and the complete version of his com-
ments suggest that Justice Scalia was especially concerned about what he termed "legislative
activism" in relatively recent years. His suggestion that the presumption of constitutionality
may no longer be warranted, however, cannot be so readily cabined; it would seem to apply
to the Court's treatment of the ADEA amendments of 1974 and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990, as well as the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. See infra Parts II
and III.
14. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (5-4
decision invalidating private damages remedy for employment discrimination against state
employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000) (5-4 decision invalidating the private damages remedy under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974 to apply to the States);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (5-4 decision invalidating the private damages remedy
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended in 1974 to apply to the States);
Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (5-4
decision invalidating the private damages remedy under the Trademark Act of 1946, as
amended in 1992 to apply to the States); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (5-4 decision invalidating the private damages remedy
under the Patent Act of 1790, as amended in 1992 to apply explicitly to the States).
The aforementioned statutes were not of particularly recent vintage. The Fair Labor
Standards Act and the ADEA were extended to the States in 1966 and 1974. See Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 832, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(4)
(modifying the definition of "employer" so as to remove the exemption of the States and
their political subdivisions with respect to employees of hospitals, institutions, and schools);
Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, section 6(a) (further ex-
tending FLSA to States); Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259,
section 28(a) (extending ADEA to States). The ADA was enacted in 1990, five years before
the Supreme Court initiated the series of decisions described in Part I that substantially re-
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 84 2001-2002
Dissing Congress
passed legislation of doubtful constitutionality, it did so in a frame-
work of respect rather than arrogance. 5 The Court has decided most
of these cases on close votes, suggesting that reasonable people could
disagree with respect to their constitutionality. 6
In this Article, we identify two distinct methodologies employed by
the Rehnquist Court that have resulted in growing disrespect for
Congress - the "crystal ball" and the "phantom legislative history"
approaches. Under the crystal ball approach, the Court effectively pe-
nalizes the enacting Congress for failing to create a detailed legislative
record, even though such a record requirement could not reasonably
have been anticipated at the moment of legislative deliberation and
enactment. 7 Unlike private parties, who routinely must adjust their
future conduct based on the Court's new teaching, Congress as a co-
equal branch is distinctive in its status and its relationship to the
Court. This difference helps account for the presumption of constitu-
tionality that traditionally attends congressional enactments. The crys-
tal ball test, however, signals a marked departure from the longstand-
ing precedent of asking whether a legislative record could have
supported the current constitutional standard had it been known to
the enacting Congress. It also results in the Court micromanaging the
work of Congress by specifying how Congress should construct a
proper legislative record.
Under the phantom legislative history approach, the Court ex-
presses interest in considering legislative history when assessing con-
stitutionality, but then establishes and applies a legal standard for re-
configured its relations with Congress. Finally, although the Patent Act was not extended to
the States explicitly until 1992, some courts had ruled that the original Patent Act had always
covered the States. See generally Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
627.
15. When Congress has been aware that its legislation raises close constitutional ques-
tions, it has often included expedited review clauses to provide that the legislation can reach
the courts in the most efficient manner possible. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (providing expedited review of Telecommunications Act's
"signal bleed" provision, requiring cable operators either to scramble sexually explicit chan-
nels in full or limit programming on such channels to certain hours; 5-4 decision found fed-
eral legislation to be unconstitutional); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)
(providing expedited review of Line Item Veto Act; 6-3 decision found federal legislation to
be unconstitutional); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (providing expedited review of
Communications Decency Act; 7-2 decision found federal legislation to be unconstitutional).
Although expedited review procedures may have become more common in recent years,
they appear to trace back at least several decades. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(providing expedited review of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971; 8-1 decision
found legislation to be unconstitutional).
16. Of the twenty-nine decisions invalidating federal laws since 1995, fourteen have
been decided by 5-4 votes and six more were decided by 6-3 votes. See supra notes 3-5. Of
the thirteen decisions we discuss in this Article, ten were decided by a 5-4 margin and two
more by 6-3 votes. See supra notes 3-5.
17. For further discussion, see infra Part II.
October 2001]
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view that even a detailed legislative record could not possibly satisfy. 8
The Court can be understood as transforming what had been consid-
ered proper factual questions within Congress's purview into legal
questions for the Court's exclusive determination. The result is the
Court taking greater power for itself, displacing Congress's proper
factfinding role.
The Court's decision in Board of Trustees v. Garrett19 underscores
the existence of, and tension between, these two methodologies. On
the one hand, the Court in Garrett demanded a depth and breadth of
documentation to support the exercise of Section 5 authority that
Congress could not possibly have foreseen in 1990 when it enacted the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). At the same time, by de-
manding a level of legislative factfinding that for practical reasons may
be unattainable, the Court signaled that it is reserving the exclusive
authority to determine when Congress has acted properly under Sec-
tion 5.2o
We do not wish to be understood as supporting every piece of leg-
islation passed by Congress. The Court's targets since 1995 have in-
cluded substantively "liberal" statutes protecting employees against
status discrimination or substandard working conditions,21 more tradi-
tionally "conservative" enactments promoting religious freedom or re-
stricting sexually offensive speech;22 and neutral laws addressing pat-
ent or trademark matters.23 While the Rehnquist Court has not
"dissed" Congress in every instance, its record of invalidations has
been remarkably severe.24 We are disturbed by the Court's emerging
18. For further discussion, see infra Part III.
19. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act's authoriza-
tion of private employment discrimination actions for monetary damages against States is
unconstitutional).
20. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
21. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (invalidating the private damages
remedy under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended in 1974 to apply to the
States); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating the private damages
remedy under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974 to
apply to the States).
22. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating private damages
remedy under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(invalidating the Communications Decency Act).
23. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666 (1999) (invaliding the private damages remedy under the Trademark Act of 1946, as
amended in 1992 to apply to the States); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating the private damages remedy under the
Patent Act of 1790, as amended in 1992 to apply explicitly to the States).
24. Since 1995, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of federal laws on several oc-
casions. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (9-0 decision holding that Driver's
Privacy Protection Act, restricting States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information,
is proper exercise of Congress's authority under Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment);
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (6-3 decision upholding constitutionality of statute
[Vol. 100:80
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vision in which Congress has substantially diminished powers to con-
duct its internal affairs or to engage in factfinding and lawmaking that
the judicial branch will respect.
In Part I, we trace the development of this recent judicial activism
in which disrespect for Congress is a fundamental element. In Part II,
we describe the Court's decisions in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents' and United States v. Morrison2 6 as examples of the crystal ball
approach, and we discuss the implications of this methodology for the
internal operations of Congress and for the exercise of federal legisla-
tive powers. In Part III, we consider Kimel and Morrison as also illus-
trating the phantom legislative history approach and discuss the sig-
nificant implications of this methodology for the relationship between
the courts and Congress. Finally, in Part IV, we invoke these two
methods to help explain the contrast between the Court's asserted in-
terest in legislative record building in the constitutional law setting
and its simultaneous disdain for legislative history when construing
statutes in nonconstitutional settings. Part IV also addresses how the
Court's legislative history approach, especially in the Section 5 area,
may actually threaten traditional federalism objectives regarding the
role of Congress.
I. THE NEW JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Since 1995, a new judicial activism has developed in which dis-
respecting Congress has become an important theme. Traditionally,
respect for democracy, and in particular for the work of Congress as a
coequal branch of government, has been a central tenet of judicial re-
view for both liberals and conservatives alike. 27 Legal theorists have
struggled from the Republic's inception to explain why judges should
even have the power to review the constitutionality of legislative ac-
tion, given what Professor Alexander Bickel termed the "counter-
governing citizenship of illegitimate children born abroad of American father and alien
mother); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (8-1 decision holding that federal
criminal law does not violate Double Jeopardy Clause). Even though most federal statutes
are never challenged in litigation because they are clearly constitutional, Congress's record
of failure before the Rehnquist Court is highly unusual.
25. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
26. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
27. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 7-8 (1980) ("The tricky task has been and remains that of devising a way or ways of
protecting minorities from majority tyranny that is not a flagrant contradiction of the princi-
ple of majority rule...."); JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106 (1901) ("[lI]t should be
remembered that the exercise of [judicial review], even when unavoidable, is always at-
tended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the
outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and
stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their
own errors.").
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majoritarian difficulty."28 After its initial declaration that Congress
could not require the Court to act unconstitutionally in Marbury v.
Madison,29 the Supreme Court did not conclude that Congress acted
unconstitutionally until the infamous Dred Scot 3° case. Subsequently,
as with the substantive due process decisions in the early twentieth
century3' and the Commerce Clause decisions overturning New Deal
legislation in the 1930s,32 the Court's aggressive incursions into federal
legislative affairs often appeared improper in hindsight.33
The Court's decision in Marbury is typically the starting point in
explaining the existence and validity of judicial review, particularly re-
view of legislation enacted by Congress. The very fact that the Court
should have the power to invalidate a federal statute was not some-
thing taken for granted before Marbury. Chief Justice Marshall's suc-
cess in justifying the possible exercise of such a power signaled the be-
ginning of a cottage industry examining that topic. 34 John Thayer, a
leading nineteenth century voice on the subject, suggested that the
way to resolve the tension between judicial review and democracy was
28. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). The Court in Marbury ad-
dressed only whether Congress could require the Court to act unconstitutionally, reasoning
that it could not. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180. Later, the Court adopted as a natural
corollary that it had the authority to use the Constitution as a sword in invalidating acts of
Congress. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (1 How.) at 455. We are grateful to David Shapiro for high-
lighting this distinction for us.
31. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (overturning legislation that
regulated employer's right to terminate employees); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905) (invalidating state legislation that regulated hours on job).
32. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (overturning legislation that
regulated labor practices in coal industry); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (overturning legislation that regulated trade practices and certain mini-
mum working standards).
33. Justice Holmes foresaw the problematic nature of the Court's social darwinism foray
into public policy with his dissenting comment in Lochner that "[t]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." 198 U.S. at 75. That quotation
has been cited favorably on innumerable occasions in judicial decisions and law review arti-
cles. See also PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 290-300 (1982) (giving short shrift
to the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the 1930s); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 231-37 (1963) (same).
34. See generally RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969);
WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1995); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE,
THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO
JUDGE-MADE LAW (1986); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues
in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1994); W. F. Dodd, The Function of
a State Constitution, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 201 (1915); Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Con-
stitutional Interpretation in the First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79 (1993); Philip A.
Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907
(1993).
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for the courts to strike down legislation only when the legislative
branch has made a "very clear" error.35 As Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
cently summarized the received wisdom in this area, "[d]ue respect for
the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we
invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds."36
This respect for Congress has been regularly voiced by the Court
since the New Deal,37 and it was solidly embedded in legal doctrine by
the mid-1970s through decisions under the Commerce Clause, Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the spending power.38 In
35. See John B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
36. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (referring to United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567, 577-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1880)). Of course, in Morrison, Lopez, and Harris, the Court over-
came the presumption of constitutionality that attends Congressional enactments.
37. See, e.g., R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., majority
opinion) ("Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at
an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay
the legislative decision,' Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S., at 612, because this Court has never
insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute. This is particularly
true where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing .... [Tihe
fact the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative,
rather than judicial, consideration."); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152, 154 (1938) ("[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be pre-
sumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pro-
nounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it
is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis
within the knowledge and experience of the legislators .... [Our inquiry,] where the legisla-
tive judgment is drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts
either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.").
38. While this Article focuses on Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and
Section 5, Congress's enumerated powers also include the power to "lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has
broadly interpreted the spending power, like Section 5 and the Commerce Clause, for many
decades. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that federal statute
conditioning receipt of highway funds on adoption of minimum drinking age is valid use of
Congress's spending power); see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (holding
that "the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution"). The
Court's new activism, however, may be triggering a reconsideration of the scope of
Congress's authority under the spending power. An Eighth Circuit panel held that section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 placed unconstitutionally broad and coercive condi-
tions on the State's receipt of federal funds, although that decision was later reversed by the
full circuit. See Bradley v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc
sub. nom. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). The Fourth Circuit has re-
cently granted en banc review, presumably to address whether Congress was sufficiently ex-
plicit in section 504 when it applied its spending power as authority to waive States' sover-
eign immunity, suggesting that it too may be reconsidering the scope of Congress's authority
under the Spending Clause. See Amos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d
212, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1999) (Williams, J., dissenting), vacated en banc by 205 F.3d 687 (4th
Cir. 2000). In addition, a district court in the Sixth Circuit recently held that Congress did
not properly use its spending power authority to confer upon private individuals a right to
enforce the terms of the Medicaid program against state officials. See Westside Mothers v.
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Katzenbach v. McClung,39 the Supreme Court unanimously held that
Congress had an ample basis under the Commerce Clause upon which
to find that racial discrimination at restaurants had a direct and ad-
verse effect on interstate commerce. ° The Court understood that
Congress should be given broad discretion under its enumerated pow-
ers to engage in factfinding to determine which kind of legislation is
necessary to serve the public good under the Commerce Clause.4"
Two years later, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Supreme Court
authored an equally strong opinion affirming the broad reach of
Congress's powers under Section 5.42 The Court held that Congress
could regulate in the civil rights area under a lenient standard of re-
view pursuant to its Section 5 powers. In a highly respectful statement,
the Court in Morgan observed: "It is not for us to review the congres-
sional resolution [of these competing considerations] .... It is enough
that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might re-
solve the conflict as it did."43 Similarly, in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach," the Court said that Congress could use "any rational
means" to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimi-
nation so long as it had laid or could have laid a sufficient factual basis
for the legislation."
Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001); see also Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 261 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding, with little explanation,
that in light of Supreme Court's Garrett decision, Eleventh Amendment's immunity also ap-
plies for private actions brought under section 504).
39. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
40. Justice Douglas, while joining the majority opinion, expressed his preference for a
Section 5 justification for Congress's authority. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]he right to be free of discrimi-
natory treatment (based on race) in places of public accommodation - whether intrastate or
interstate - is a right guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment and...
state enforcement of the kind of trespass laws which Maryland had in that case was state ac-
tion within the meaning of the Amendment."). Justice Douglas's opinion also applied to
McClung. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 279.
41. Justice Clark's opinion for the Court gave considerable deference to Congress's
power to engage in factfinding:
Congress has determined for itself that refusals of service to Negroes have imposed burdens
both upon the interstate flow of food and upon the movement of products generally. Of
course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed to af-
fect commerce does not preclude further examination by this Court. But where we find that
the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for find-
ing a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is
at an end.
McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
42. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (7-2 decision).
43. Id. at 653.
44. 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (8-1 decision applying Section 2 of Fifteenth Amendment).
45. Id. at 324. While the Court in South Carolina construed Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment, it was addressing the closely analogous issue of Congress's "appropriate"
authority to implement antidiscrimination prohibitions of the Civil War Amendments as
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The scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority received a
further nod in Maryland v. Wirtz, when the Court ruled that Congress
had the power under that clause to apply the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") to state employees.46 The Court recognized the Elev-
enth Amendment issues of proper relief that might arise in suits
against the States but held that those issues did not preclude the Court
from ruling that state employees could be covered by the FLSA. It ap-
plied the McClung holding, requiring Congress simply to provide a
"rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the
protection of commerce."47
This series of decisions understandably gave the Congress of the
1970s little pause for concern as it enacted legislation regulating the
States. Congress in 1972 amended Title VII to cover state employees,48
and two years later it amended the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ("ADEA") and the FLSA to cover state employees as
well.49 Each bill included controversial aspects, but there is no hint in
the legislative record of either statute that Congress was concerned
about its constitutional authority to provide for private monetary
damage actions against states.50 Both the Commerce Clause and Sec-
tion 5 were understood to offer justifications for these extensions.
Although the Court's decisions of the 1970s and 1980s provide
hints that deference to Congress might be eroding, nothing dramatic
took place to alter the fundamental legal landscape. The decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery was an attempt to reign in
Congress's Commerce Clause powers under the Tenth Amendment."
Some commentators considered the National League of Cities decision
against the reserved powers of the States. Id. at 308, 324. The language of Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment is virtually identical to the language of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."), with U.S. CONST. amend.
XV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
46. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The vote was 6-2; Justice Marshall did not participate in the
case.
47. Id. at 190 (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04). By distinguishing
the question of the scope of the Commerce Clause from the question of the limitations im-
posed on Congress by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court in Wirtz did not permit federal-
ist impulses to derail its deferential approach to separation of powers issues under the
Commerce Clause.
48. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
49. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994)) (amending FLSA); Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b)
(1994)) (amending ADEA).
50. See infra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
51. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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to be a significant development at the time," but the Court overruled
itself fairly quickly in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.3 The Court ultimately concluded that National League of
Cities created an unworkable distinction between "traditional" and
"nontraditional" governmental functions. 4 Further, even apart from
its Garcia decision, the Court had ceased to find the distinction help-
ful. Both lower courts and the Supreme Court had declined to use that
framework to invalidate federal legislation as improperly intruding
upon the States.55 Decisions such as EEOC v. Wyoming5" and Johnson
v. City of Baltimore7 gave members of Congress little reason to be-
lieve that National League of Cities had substantially diminished their
powers to regulate the States under the Commerce Clause.
52. Scholars writing shortly after National League of Cities disagreed about the impor-
tance of that decision. Compare Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities:
The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1075-76 (1977) ("The language of National League of Cities is indeed quite con-
sistent with a protected state role premised on individual rights .... In broad outline, the
argument would be that policy-based legislation by Congress that endangers the provision of
certain traditional services.., is constitutionally problematic not because it strikes an unac-
ceptable balance between national and state interests as such, but because it hinders and
may even foreclose attempts by states or localities to meet their citizens' legitimate expecta-
tions of basic government services."), with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, American Constitutional
Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 340, 344-45 (1978) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)) ("Also extravagant is Tribe's treatment of National League
of Cities v. Usery as a seed decision for a bold vision of federalism in service of individual
rights .... For those lacking the intensely imaginative mind, National League of Cities is
more securely explained as entirely apiece with, and a formidable addition to, a spate of re-
cent decisions in which the autonomy of state and local governments in 'Our Federalism,'
not individual rights against the state, is the overarching concern.").
53. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
54. Id. at 531 ("Our examination of this 'function' standard applied in these and other
cases over the last eight years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of
state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not only un-
workable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with
those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest. That
case, accordingly, is overruled.").
55. According to Professor Deborah Merritt:
National League of Cities was a revolutionary opinion .... In fact, however, National League
of Cities had a limited impact on the law. Although litigants raised tenth amendment claims
in more than three hundred cases reported after National League of Cities, courts rejected
most of those claims. The Supreme Court itself never relied upon National League of Cities
to invalidate any other federal law. Instead, the Court progressively narrowed the effective-
ness of its tenth amendment principles in a series of cases decided between 1976 and 1985.
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1988).
56. 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (holding that extension of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act to cover state and local governments was a valid exercise of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause and was not precluded by virtue of the Court's Tenth Amend-
ment decision in National League of Cities).
57. 472 U.S. 353 (1985) (holding that provision in federal civil service statute requiring
most federal firefighters to retire at age fifty-five did not establish that age fifty-five was a
bona fide occupational requirement under the ADEA for nonfederal firefighters).
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A suggestion that congressional power might be eroding in the
Section 5 setting occurred in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 8 in which the
Court, without a majority opinion, sustained Congress's powers to
create racial preferences under the Public Works Employment Act of
1977.19 Two members of the Court (Justices Rehnquist and Stewart)
concluded that Congress should be treated like state legislatures when
it enacted racially conscious legislation.' Nonetheless, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for himself and Justices White and Powell, sustained
the federal legislation in Fullilove under a framework imbued with
deference to Congress.61
58. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). An earlier hint of the Court's discomfort with broad Congres-
sional power under Section 5 can be seen in the Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970), in which the Court upheld the franchise extension to eighteen-year-olds in
federal elections but struck down its application to state elections. The Mitchell opinion,
however, was described as "a constitutional law disaster," because it created a distinction
between federal and state elections that was supported only by the opinion of one member
of the Court, Justice Black. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Proc-
ess and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 609 (1975). Four Justices voted to sustain
the franchise provision in its entirety; four Justices voted to invalidate it in its entirety.
Professor Sager described this splintered holding as "betraying a state of analytical disar-
ray." See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1232 (1978). Justice Brennan, who authored
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), wrote an opinion in Mitchell in which he justi-
fied the voting rights extension under Section 5, but Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, who were not members of the Court when Morgan was decided, did not join the
Brennan opinion. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justices Burger and Blackmun joined an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, arguing
that Section 5 gave Congress power to do no more than "provide the means of eradicating
situations that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 296 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The position taken by Justices Burger and
Blackmun was short-lived; in subsequent cases, they joined opinions of the Court that were
highly deferential to Congress's exercise of its Section 5 powers. See infra notes 63-64 and
accompanying text.
59. Under this law, ten percent of the federal funds granted for local public works proj-
ects must be used by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from busi-
nesses owned and controlled by members of statutorily identified minority groups. 448 U.S.
at 453. Although the Supreme Court had applied strict scrutiny to racial preferences created
by state government two years earlier in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), Chief Justice Burger's lead opinion (for himself and Justices White and
Powell) declined to impose such a rigorous test on the federal government. The concurrence
by Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun insisted that the correct legal standard when
affirmative action programs are enacted by the federal or state government is intermediate
scrutiny. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 518.
60. Id. at 526-29. The other dissenting opinion in the case - authored by Justice Stevens
- concluded that affirmative action can be constitutionally created by Congress, but that
this particular program was not constitutional because of the inartful way that the categories
of beneficiaries were defined. Id. at 537-41.
61. Id. at 472 ("A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial con-
text, calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to
'provide for the ... general Welfare of the United States' and 'to enforce, by appropriate
legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (omission in
original).
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The lead opinion held that the law could be justified under Section
5 (as well as the Commerce Clause). To reach that conclusion, the
Chief Justice examined the legislative history of the Minority Business
Enterprise provision, carefully noting that Congress "may legislate
without compiling the kind of 'record' appropriate with respect to ju-
dicial or administrative proceedings."'62 Moreover, the lead opinion did
not require that the record demonstrate problems at the state level.
Indeed, the Chief Justice was willing to extrapolate from evidence re-
garding federal procurement contracts that similar problems existed at
the state and local government level.63 Although federalism concerns
had begun to surface with respect to some justices' understanding of
the grant of power to Congress under Section 5,6 the Court in this
same period remained highly respectful of Congress's authority to en-
act "appropriate" legislation regulating the States.65
The Court also resisted an attempt to diminish Congressional
authority under Commerce Clause jurisprudence in 1989 when it held
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company' that the Commerce Clause
granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
The Court granted certiorari in Union Gas despite the fact that every
Court of Appeals had concluded that Congress had the authority to
62. Id. at 478.
63. Id.
64. The argument that Congress should be entitled to a more deferential standard than
the States in the equality context did not command majority support from the Court in
Fullilove. The liberal wing of the Court (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) thought
that Bakke was incorrectly decided, and that remedial measures should pass muster under
the standard imposed on the States or federal government under the Constitution. Id. at 517.
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart also believed that there should be one constitutional stan-
dard in the equal protection context; under that uniform standard, the remedial program in
Fullilove should be held unconstitutional, as the state remedial program had been in Bakke.
id. at 523.
When Fullilove was decided, Justices White and Powell joined Chief Justice Burger's
opinion concluding that Congress was entitled to greater deference than the States. Com-
bining Justices White, Powell and Burger with the liberal wing of the Court resulted in the
Court upholding Congress's power to enact racial preference legislation.
As recently as 1990, the traditional line prevailed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, with five members of the Court voting to uphold the policies of the Federal
Communication Commission designed to favor minority broadcasting firms. See Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion, in
which he emphasized that a lesser standard than strict scrutiny applied to the federal gov-
ernment when it created racial preferences for remedial purposes. Justices Burger and
Powell were no longer members of the Court, but Justices White and Stevens joined the lib-
erals to form a majority vote for that position.
65. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180-82 (1980) (adopting, by a 6-3
margin, deferential stance toward Congress's judgment in 1975 that preclearance require-
ment of Voting Rights Act should be extended for another seven years as a constitutional
method of enforcing Fifteenth Amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)
(upholding, by a 9-0 vote, Congress's Section 5 authority to extend Title VII to state em-
ployers against Eleventh Amendment challenge).
66. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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abrogate states' immunity from suit when legislating pursuant to the
plenary power granted it by the Constitution, such as the Commerce
Clause.67 As in the Equal Protection Clause context, Justice White
added the fifth vote in Union Gas to create a majority for that posi-
tion, although no opinion garnered the majority support of the Court.
Justice White's separate opinion did not explain his rationale for con-
cluding that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.6"
Given this constitutional landscape, Congress again had little rea-
son to doubt the constitutionality of its work as it passed the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") in 1990.69 The ADA
equally regulated the private and public sectors. It was widely under-
stood to increase the regulation of the private sector, because section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act7" already regulated the public sector.
Hence, little thought was given to whether the ADA could constitu-
67. Id. at 15. The rationale for these conclusions was founded in the Court's decision in
Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964),
which held that "the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce." Id. at 191. Over seventy years before Parden,
the Court held that the grant of jurisdiction to federal courts under Article III did not itself
abrogate state sovereign immunity as embodied under the Eleventh Amendment. See Hans
v. Louisiana 134 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1890) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars claim in federal
court alleging state violation of Contracts Clause).
68. 491 U.S. at 57 (White, J., concurring) ("I agree with the conclusion reached by
Justice Brennan in Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority under Article I to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not agree with
much of his reasoning."). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, dissented on the Eleventh Amendment issue. Justice Scalia distin-
guished the Section 5 context from the Commerce Clause context by noting that the Section
5 abrogation principles could not be applied to "antecedent provisions of the Constitution."
Id. at 42. In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment could abrogate sovereign immunity
because it was ratified after the Eleventh Amendment, but the Commerce Clause could not
abrogate sovereign immunity because it was ratified before the Eleventh Amendment.
Justice Scalia and the other members of the current conservative majority have argued in
more recent cases, however, that sovereign immunity did not become embedded in the
Constitution through the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 712-27 (1999). The narrow and awkward language of the Eleventh Amendment
could not be understood to have created on its own such a sweeping sovereign immunity.
Rather, the new understanding of sovereign immunity is that it was always a part of the Con-
stitution as an implied principle. Under this view, the ratifiers of the Constitution were
aware of sovereign immunity principles when they granted Congress power under the Com-
merce Clause, just as later framers were aware of sovereign immunity principles when they
granted Congress power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Scalia's
chronological argument in Union Gas, distinguishing Congress's powers under the Com-
merce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, is no longer consistent with the
more recent position taken by the Court majority, of which he is a part.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Congress would have reasonably thought it had
authority to regulate the States pursuant to its Commerce Clause and Section 5 authority.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (requiring entities that receive "federal
financial assistance" not to discriminate on the basis of disability).
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tionally provide for private damage actions against the state.71 Simi-
larly, Congress extended the patent and copyright laws to the States in
bipartisan and noncontroversial legislation in 1992.72 Finally, the Gun-
Free School Zones Act73 and the Violence Against Women Act74 were
part of omnibus crime bills opposed by the gun lobby. Although each
bill attracted policy-based opposition, the constitutionality of the two
provisions was not seriously challenged.75
71. Although the Attorney General testified about the ADA on a couple of occasions,
he was never asked about the constitutionality of ADA Title II during these hearings. See
generally Hearings Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcom-
mittee of the Handicapped on S. 933, 101st Cong. (1989). For discussion of the Attorney
General's testimony, see Ruth Colker, ADA Title 111: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY
J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 384 (2000). The constitutionality of ADA Title II did not arise as
an issue at any of the hearings held by Congress or in any of the reports prepared by
Congress on the ADA.
72. Congress considered the two bills concurrently. See generally S. REP. No. 102-280
(1992). The Senate Report reflects awareness that the Eleventh Amendment posed constitu-
tional questions concerning the validity of these bills but also an understanding that the most
important factor was whether Congress was explicit in regulating States based on the Court's
decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). See S. REP. No. 102-
280, at 5-8. The patent and trademark laws only stated that they covered "whoever" in-
fringed a patent or trademark. Some lower courts had held that that language was not suffi-
ciently precise to make the States subject to regulation. See, e.g., Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v.
Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331
(Fed. Cir. 1990). Congress therefore amended these laws in 1992 to make coverage of the
States explicit. No one appeared to question the constitutionality of these measures.
73. The Gun-Free School Zones Act was part of the Crime Control Act of 1990 that
President Bush signed into law on November 29, 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat.
4789, 4844-45 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1998)).
74. The Violence Against Women Act was part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 that President Clinton signed into law on September 13, 1994. Pub.
L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1941-42 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1999)); see
also Legislative History of Violence Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839.
75. The legislative history for the Gun-Free School Zones Act is sparse. It was discussed
at one House subcommittee hearing where Representative William Hughes, chair of the
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee, asserted that the legislation
would reflect "a major departure from a traditional federalism concept which basically de-
fers to State and local units of government to enforce their laws." House Hearings on H.R.
3757, at 14. Although both the House and Senate sponsors of the bill made fairly lengthy
floor statements about it, neither of them commented on the constitutionality of the meas-
ure. See 136 Cong. Rec. S175959 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kohl); 136 Cong. Rec. S766
(1990) (same); 135 Cong. Rec. E3988 (1989) (inserted statement of Rep. Feighan). Despite
signing the bill, President Bush did state that the Gun-Free School Zones Act provision "in-
appropriately overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal
law. The policies reflected in these provisions could legitimately be adopted by the States,
but they should not be imposed upon the States by the Congress." Statement of President
George Bush on Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990, 26 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc.
1944, 1945 (Nov. 29, 1990). The President did not refer to his concerns as constitutional;
given his oath to uphold the Constitution, one can presume he would not have signed the bill
if he had genuine constitutional concerns.
The Violence Against Women Act's ("VAWA") civil remedy provision received com-
paratively more examination by Congress. The Act was passed in 1994, after the Supreme
Court had granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, but before the Court rendered its decision in Lopez. Although the Fifth Circuit had
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Most of the statutes in this time period that Congress knew raised
constitutional questions - the Telecommunications Act,76 the Com-
munications Decency Act,77 and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act,78 for example - related to tugs of war between the courts and
Congress regarding the scope of the First Amendment's protections
for free speech and religious liberty.79 Jurists and scholars have dis-
ruled that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional, see United States v. Lopez,
2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), Congress saw little need to defend the constitutionality of
VAWA's civil remedies provision. As the Fifth Circuit itself noted in its opinion, it was the
first appellate court to be asked to consider the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act. Id. at 1345. There was no developing trend in the appellate courts that might
have alerted Congress to a shifting constitutional law standard in the Commerce Clause
area. More generally, it is unrealistic to expect members of Congress to be aware of lower
court decisions on a seemingly distinct topic (guns at school as compared to violence against
women) and therefore to make last minute adjustments to pending legislation in light of pos-
sible future constitutional law developments. See also Robert Katzmann, Bridging the
Statutory Gulf: A Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 662 (1992) (find-
ing that most lower court decisions are not noticed even by committee leaders and their
staffs, much less by members in general). Not surprisingly, the Lopez Fifth Circuit decision
was not mentioned at any VAWA hearing.
During the several year period when VAWA was under consideration in Congress,
members were given little reason to be concerned about VAWA's constitutionality. The
principal statements questioning VAWA's constitutionality consisted of a letter from the
Department of Justice, authored in October 1990, that questioned the constitutionality of a
predecessor to VAWA, as well as testimony by attorney Bruce Fein, who stated in 1993 that
"the bill in my judgment skates close, if not over, a constitutional line." Crimes of Violence
Motivated by Gender, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary, House of Repre-
sentatives, 103d Cong., Nov. 16, 1993, at 26 [hereinafter "1993 VAWA Hearings"]. Fein,
however, did not question Congress's constitutional authority to enact legislation in this
area; rather, he questioned whether Congress's findings were factually sufficient to justify
the bill. Id. In that regard, Professors Cass Sunstein and Burt Neuborne testified that
VAWA was a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause and Section 5. See Violence Against
Women: Victims of the System, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, 102d Cong., April 19, 1991, at 87-88, 94-99, 103-07, 112-25; [hereinafter "1991
VAWA Hearings"]; 1993 VAWA Hearings at 42-47, 51, 56-68 (reprinting their 1991 testi-
mony). When asked at the 1991 Hearings the level of proof necessary to make clear the con-
stitutional bases for the law, Sunstein responded: "Fortunately for the equal protection issue
as well as for the Commerce Clause issue, the standard of review is the rational basis test. So
you don't need a whole lot." 1991 VAWA Hearings, at 125. Similarly, Sally Goldfarb, Senior
Staff Attorney of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, testified that both Section 5
and the Commerce Clause were alternative constitutional bases for VAWA. See 1993
VAWA Hearings at 13. Finally, James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General in the
Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, testified at the 1993 hearings that both Section 5
and the Commerce Clause provided constitutional bases for VAWA. Id. at 96-108. The con-
stitutional focus at these hearings (insofar as there was one) was whether Congress had en-
gaged in sufficient factfinding to meet the "substantial effects" test, not whether the "sub-
stantial effects" test was the proper constitutional standard for Congress to use in assessing
the scope of its powers. As we discuss below, the evidentiary question of whether gender-
based crimes have a substantial effect on interstate commerce was not the basis on which the
Court subsequently invalidated VAWA in Morrison. See infra Part III.
76. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
77. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
78. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). An example from a slightly earlier
period is United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating federal flag burning
statute)-
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agreed over the constitutionality of congressional limitations in these
areas throughout our history, including the 1990s.0
Beginning in 1995, however, a series of Supreme Court decisions
dramatically altered the separation of powers landscape. As Justice
Scalia intimated in his recent speech, the Court has weakened the pre-
sumption that federal legislation is constitutional.8' The first major in-
dication that the presumption might be eroding occurred in 1995 in
United States v. Lopez.82 A bipartisan Congress had passed the Gun-
79. Another statute involving anticipated constitutional controversy was the Line Item
Veto Act. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). That statute, however,
raised pure separation of powers issues unrelated to federalism. Again, the statute was
highly popular in Congress, although members recognized concerns as to its constitutional-
ity. In recognition of this constitutional doubt, Congress created an expedited review proce-
dure while the bill was in Conference to have the statute's constitutionality tested quickly in
court. In contrast to the many statutes reviewed at supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text,
the legislative history of the Line Item Veto Act is replete with discussion of the constitu-
tionality of the measure and the best mechanism to have the constitutionality assessed. See,
e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-491, § 3, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. 6016, 6017 (1996) (setting
forth expedited judicial review procedure); 141 CONG. REC. 8420 (1995) (remarks of Sen.
Exon, bill supporter, recognizing constitutional questions); 142 CONG. REC. 6504-21 (1996)
(remarks of Sen. Byrd, discussing constitutional problems at length); id at 6535-38 (remarks
of Sen. Levin questioning constitutionality); id. at 6540-42 (remarks of Sen. Bumpers ques-
tioning constitutionality).
One further constitutional controversy that arose during the 1990s involved limitations
on the processes or mechanisms by which Congress may use its Article I powers to regulate
the States. Without questioning Congress's authority to regulate directly, the Court held that
Congress was prohibited by the Tenth Amendment from "commandeering" state legislative
processes to regulate radioactive waste disposal on an indirect basis, and likewise was barred
from commandeering a state's executive branch officials to regulate indirectly the purchase
of handguns. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992). We regard these two decisions as relying primarily though not exclu-
sively on considerations of federalism, i.e., that Congress could not "blur state legislative [or
executive] accountability to the state's residents by coercing the state's legislature [or execu-
tive] to act in accordance with a federally established agenda." DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 68 (1995). Their detailed treatment is beyond the scope of this
Article. See SHAPIRO at 111-15 (discussing New York); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the
Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) (discussing
Printz).
80. At the RFRA hearings, Representative Henry Hyde expressed concern about
whether Congress had the power to "restore" earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence through
a legislative act. See Religious Freedom Act of 1991, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, 102d Cong., May 13-14, 1992, at 95. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, Professor Douglas Laycock reassured Congress that it did have the
power to enact RFRA under Section 5 because its enforcement powers "go beyond what the
Court may do under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 397. Nonetheless, Professor Ira
Lupu testified that RFRA suffered from constitutional problems and urged Congress to de-
fer enacting such legislation until it was able to read the Court's decision in a pending case
- New York v. United States. Id. at 399. Professor Lupu, however, also informed Congress
that factfinding "would buttress the case for constitutionality of the bill under Section Five."
Id. at 399. For further discussion of RFRA and its legislative history, see Ruth Colker, City
of Boerne Revisited, 70 U. CINC. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2001).
81. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also supra note 13.
82. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Earlier hints of a changing presumption can be found in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (limiting Congressional regulation of state govern-
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Free School Zones Act of 1990, making it a federal offense "for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."83
Congress had little reason to question its constitutional authority
to enact such legislation under the Commerce Clause. As discussed
above, Congress under existing precedent merely needed to establish
that there was a "rational basis" for concluding that a regulated activ-
ity sufficiently affected interstate commerce." The relevant legal ques-
tion would have been: "Could Congress rationally have found that
violent crime in school zones, through its effect on the quality of edu-
cation, significantly (or substantially) affects interstate or foreign
commerce?" 85
Although Congress did not include detailed findings in the 1990
Act's legislative history demonstrating a substantial connection be-
tween gun-related violence and interstate commerce, one certainly
could find support for such a conclusion in the testimony, reports and
studies that had been generated both inside and outside of Congress. 6
ment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act), and New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (holding that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act was
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment because it commandeered state power).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A).
84. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981). As
Justice Souter stated in dissent in Lopez:
The practice of deferring to rationally based legislative judgments "is a paradigm of judicial
restraint." FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). In judicial review
under the Commerce Clause, it reflects our respect for the institutional competence of the
Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of
the legitimacy that comes from Congress's political accountability in dealing with matters
open to a wide range of possible choices.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
86. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 3757 Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 44 (1990) (testimony of National Education Asso-
ciation that school violence contributes significantly to dropout rate and fear of such vio-
lence undermines schools' ability to retain qualified teachers and administrators); Joseph F.
Sheley et al., Gun-Related Violence in and Around Inner-City Schools, 146 AMER. J.
DISEASES CHILD. 677 (1992) (survey-based study involving over 1600 students finds that
violence is brought into schools from outside, and interventions in community and social
structures are the only feasible means of addressing problem). Justices Breyer, Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg marshaled such evidence in their dissent. They argued that:
reports, hearings, and other readily available literature make clear that the problem of guns
in and around schools is widespread and extremely serious .... Having found that guns in
schools significantly undermine the quality of education in our Nation's classrooms,
Congress could also have found, given the effect of education upon interstate and foreign
commerce, that gun-related violence in and around schools is a commercial, as well as a hu-
man, problem .... Finally, there is evidence that, today more than ever, many firms base
their location decisions upon the presence, or absence, of a work force with a basic educa-
tion.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619-622 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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If one were operating under the presumption that Congress has acted
constitutionally, such material might have passed muster. The Lopez
Court, however, began to shift that presumption by viewing the cup as
half empty rather than half full. It quoted all the caveats found in prior
majority opinions about the limited scope of Congress's authority, de-
spite the fact that these prior opinions had all upheld Congressional
authority." For the first time in many decades, the Court ruled that
Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause.
Lopez initially was regarded by many observers as a relatively
modest change, given the lack of explicit legislative findings to support
the federal legislation at the time of passage and the narrow scope of
the statute in question." But the Court in Lopez had taken an impor-
tant step in developing its new version of judicial activism, under
which Congress was accorded less respect for its handiwork. The deci-
sion in United States v. Morrison,9 discussed in detail below, reflects
the dramatic nature of the Lopez holding. The Morrison Court struck
down a post-Lopez statute with a lengthy legislative history and broad
statutory coverage.
The second major indication of change in 1995 came shortly after
the Lopez decision. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,90 the Court
declared that Congress must abide by the same constitutional stan-
dards as the States in the equal protection context, despite the differ-
ing textual support for equality rules in the federal and state settings.9
The principle of "congruence" between the rules that applied to the
federal government and the States overrode the principle of respect
for Congress as a coequal branch of government.92
87. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-58 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-
95 (1824); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
88. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 685, 693 (1996) ("As a practical matter, Lopez has deprived Congress of very little
power."); Nagel, supra note 6, at 661 ("Those who perceive in [the Lopez] decision much to
fear or much to hope for are, I think, not only seeing Lopez and the Court's overall record
inaccurately, but they are looking for the future in the wrong place.").
89. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
90. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
91. As the Court's opinion explained:
Adarand's claim arises under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that
"No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Although this Court has always understood that Clause to provide some measure of protec-
tion against arbitrary treatment by the Federal Government, it is not as explicit a guarantee
of equal treatment as the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (emphasis
added). Our cases have accorded varying degrees of significance to the difference in the lan-
guage of those two Clauses. We think it necessary to revisit the issue here.
Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
92. Justice O'Connor cited three propositions that led her to the conclusion "that any
person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the
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In dissent, Justice Stevens took aim at what he called the Court's
"extraordinary proposition" "that Congress' institutional competence
and constitutional authority entitles it to no greater deference when it
enacts a program designed to foster equality than the deference due to
a state legislature."93 He noted that the distinction between how the
States and how Congress should be treated by the courts is explicitly
embedded in the Constitution
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the same
time it expressly limits the States. This is no accident. It represents our
Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experience throughout our sorry
history of race relations, that the Federal Government must be the pri-
mary defender of racial minorities against the States, some of which may
be inclined to oppress such minorities. A rule of "congruence" that ig-
nores a purposeful "incongruity" so fundamental to our system of gov-
ernment is unacceptable. 94
In response, Justice O'Connor stated:
But requiring that Congress, like the States, enact racial classifications
only when doing so is necessary to further a "compelling interest" does
not contravene any principle of appropriate respect for a coequal branch
of the Government. It is true that various Members of this Court have
taken different views of the authority [Section] Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with the problem of racial
discrimination, and the extent to which courts should defer to Congress'
exercise of that authority.... We need not, and do not, address these dif-
ferences today.95
Justice O'Connor's response, however, was not satisfactory at the
structural level, because she offered no textual or historical support
for the notion that the framers of the Constitution intended Congress
and the States to abide by the same standards in the equality context.
Congruence between the federal and state constitutional standards
may have been convenient, but she failed to show how it was constitu-
tionally grounded. 96 Rather than using the Eleventh Amendment to
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment un-
der the strictest judicial scrutiny." Id. at 224. Those three propositions were: (1) skepticism
("[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most search-
ing examination"), id. at 223; (2) consistency ("the standard of review under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification"), id. at 224; and (3) congruence ("equal protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment"), id. at 224. For the
derivation of the congruence proposition, she cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976), a
case that involved the application of equal protection principles to the electoral process in a
nonracial context. Id. at 224.
93. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 255.
95. Id. at 230-31.
96. States are required to abide by the principle of equal protection through the explicit
text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. By contrast, Congress has by implication
been understood as required to abide by the principle of equal protection through a broad
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limit the nature of the relief that might be imposed on state govern-
ments, or the Tenth Amendment to limit how far Congress may in-
trude into the affairs of state government, the Adarand Court directly
withdrew from Congress powers to enact legislation under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Adarand decision has had a major
impact in the voting rights area, because such a strict standard of re-
view has undermined meaningful enforcement of the Voting Rights
Act by the United States Department of Justice.97
The next major indications of change in the separation of powers
framework arose in 1996 and 1997 through the decisions in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida" and City of Boerne v. Flores.99 Although the
Seminole Tribe case involved an obscure struggle over negotiations
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, it resulted in a pathbreak-
ing determination. The Court held that, notwithstanding Congress's
clear intention to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian
Commerce Clause (which is akin to the Interstate Commerce Clause)
does not grant Congress that power.l" ° This conclusion was inconsis-
tent with the Court's Pennsylvania v. Union Gas'01 decision seven
years earlier, in which it had held that the Interstate Commerce
Clause granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity. Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas, depriving Congress of an
important tool for regulating the States. In the future, Congress would
have to look outside the Commerce Clause when it wished to pass
reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This implied requirement is
particularly difficult to discern and apply, however, because Congress also has the explicit
power to enforce the equality provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment through
its Section 5 powers. For further discussion of Congress's role in the equal protection con-
text, see Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 662-64 (2000).
97. See generally Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that nonminority appellants have stated
a valid equal protection claim under strict scrutiny by alleging that the state adopted a ra-
cially segregated reapportionment scheme to comply with the Voting Rights Act). In Bush,
Justice O'Connor wrote her own concurrence, emphasizing that compliance with the Voting
Rights Act might constitute a compelling interest sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny, but
in each of these three cases she failed to find such an interest met. See generally Samuel
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, Ill
HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2276 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Dif-
ferent, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1219 (1996).
98. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
99. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
100. The Commerce Clause in full provides Congress with the power "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Court also held in Seminole Tribe that the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), may not be used to enforce the statutory requirements against a state official.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73. That ruling may ultimately prove highly significant in the re-
shaping of the relationship between the judicial and legislative branches, but discussion of
that possibility is beyond the scope of this Article.
101. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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legislation that subjected the States to suits for damages by private
citizens.
One presumptive source of authority was Section 5, because the
Court had consistently approved civil rights legislation justified under
that authority. 2 The Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne,
however, suggested that deferential review of Congress's work pursu-
ant to Section 5 was no longer the norm. Congress had enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") of 1993 in direct re-
sponse to the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith.1°3 In
Smith, the Court had held that neutral, generally applicable laws may
be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a com-
pelling governmental interest. Congress was unhappy with that deci-
sion and passed RFRA to "restore the compelling interest test.., and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion
is substantially burdened."'" Both in the title of the statute and in the
purpose section, 5 Congress openly asserted that it wished to "re-
store" the constitutional law of free exercise to where that constitu-
tional standard had been before the Smith decision, in contravention
of Congress's role as circumscribed beginning with Marbury v.
Madison.°6
Given the unusual circumstances of RFRA, the Court could have
ruled that Congress violated Marbury by attempting to dictate the
meaning of the Constitution. Indeed, not one member of the Court
concluded that Congress had the power to "restore" the law of free
exercise by invoking its Section 5 powers. 7 Even Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, who rarely conclude that Congress has exceeded its author-
ity, agreed that RFRA was unconstitutional.0 8
102. See Fizpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966) (discussed at supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text).
103. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
104. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994)).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
106. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
107. Congress sought to justify RFRA under its Section 5 powers as permissible en-
forcement legislation. Nonetheless, no member of the Court disagreed with the proposition
that the legislation was flatly inconsistent with Smith. Justice O'Connor dissented (with
Justice Breyer) by arguing that Smith itself was wrongly decided and should be reconsidered.
City of Boerne, 524 U.S. at 544-45. Justice Souter dissented separately, arguing that the writ
of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted, and the case should be set down
for reargument on the question of whether Smith was correctly decided. He, too, saw the
decision in the case as hinging on the merit of the Smith decision. Id. at 565-66.
108. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens joined the majority opinion; Justice Stevens also
authored a separate opinion in which he concluded that RFRA violated the Establishment
Clause. See id. at 536. (Stevens, J., concurring). Apart from relying on Marbury, the Court
could have invalidated RFRA by following another, comparably cautious, mode of analysis
under Section 5. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court had made clear that Section 5 confers
upon Congress powers to enforce equal protection guarantees but not to "restrict, abrogate,
or dilute these guarantees," or otherwise to act inconsistently with "the letter and spirit of
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Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, however, did not merely
hold that RFRA was unconstitutional in Marbury terms; it set forth a
new framework for considering the constitutionality of Congress's ac-
tions under Section 5. For the first time since 1883, the Court ruled
that Congress exceeded its Section 5 authority."9 Although the major-
ity's opinion in Boerne was loaded with qualifications and caveats,110
this new framework imposed on Congress a much higher burden of
proof in establishing the constitutionality of its actions under Section
5. First, the Court emphasized the difference between "remedial" and
"substantive" legislation, concluding that Congress could only enact
legislation that reflects "proportionality or congruence between the
means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. ' .' It couched
that distinction in terms that are deferential to Congress, yet, as future
decisions reflect, the deferential language has turned out to be largely
rhetorical."2
Second, and of particular relevance here, the Court emphasized
the importance of a legislative record to support the need for the re-
medial legislation. Again, it framed the test in conventional terms,
asking if Congress had used "reasonable means" to exercise its reme-
dial or preventive power."3 The application of this standard, however,
was far more rigorous than it had been in prior cases. The Court
chided Congress for producing a legislative record that "lacks exam-
ples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because
of religious bigotry.""' 4 Yet even the majority's own recitation of the
legislative history reflects that Congress gave careful consideration to
the constitution." 384 U.S. 641, 651 & n.10. It is possible to argue that Congress's Section 5
powers, recognized in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents as "prohibiting a somewhat broader
swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text," 528
U.S. 62, 81 (2000), do not apply to the same extent in the free exercise area, because the Es-
tablishment Clause acts as a ceiling on free exercise protection. For further discussion of this
argument, see Colker, supra note 80.
109. Not since the controversial decision in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in
which the Court held that Congress lacked the constitutionality authority to regulate the pri-
vate sector under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, had the Court struck down
civil rights legislation. The Adarand decision, although not involving traditional civil rights
legislation, may have foreshadowed the willingness of the Court to invalidate legislative ac-
tion taken pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
110. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens joined the Boerne majority opinion. Given their sub-
sequent positions in Section 5 cases, it is possible they did not appreciate how the opinion
subtly created a basis for new limitations on Congress's powers.
111. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
112. The majority said: "While the line between measures that remedy or prevent un-
constitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is
not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the
distinction exists and must be observed." Id. at 519-20. We discuss the phantom nature of
this requirement at infra Part IllI.
113. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
114. Id. at 530. The examples were purportedly more than forty years old. Id.
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the problem of religious discrimination before enacting legislation."5
While Congress may have overreached in fundamental terms by in ef-
fect declaring that the Court's constitutional interpretation was unlaw-
ful, the legislative record supporting RFRA was no weaker than the
legislative record of other statutes that the Court had upheld under
Section 5 in prior years.
In a revealing statement, the Court noted that "[t]his lack of sup-
port in the legislative record, however, is not RFRA's most serious
shortcoming." '116 It would have been more appropriate for the Court
not to list RFRA's legislative history as a shortcoming at all, but rather
simply to conclude that RFRA exceeded Congress's enforcement
authority. Instead, the Court started down the path toward what we
describe as a phantom legislative history requirement - a require-
ment that the Court finds unmet irrespective of Congress's diligence.
Thus, through decisions in two different areas of the law - Com-
merce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment - the
Court has substantially altered the relationship between the courts and
Congress. Beginning in 1995, a longstanding presumption of deference
toward the work of Congress has been peeled away.
II. CRYSTAL BALLS
Although the new activist majority has often disdained legislative
history when engaging in traditional statutory interpretation,"7 it has
made legislative history relevant when considering the constitutional-
ity of legislation under Section 5 and the Commerce Clause. As origi-
nally stated in the Commerce Clause context in Katzenbach v.
McClung, the existence of legislative history that rationally supports
an asserted burden on interstate commerce was supposed to put an
end to the Court's own investigation into the question of whether
Congress was entitled to regulate, because the Court would defer to
Congress's findings. "8 While congressional hearings did not obviate
the Court's responsibility to determine for itself whether a measure
was constitutional, the Court was not requiring Congress to engage in
substantial factfinding as part of its daily work before enacting legisla-
tion. Indeed, as recently as 1980, a lead opinion of the Court empha-
115. See id. at 530-31 (reviewing testimony by eleven witnesses at three congressional
hearings concerning history of religious persecution in the United States, including accounts
of autopsies performed on Jewish individuals and Hmong immigrants in violation of their
religious beliefs, and descriptions of zoning regulations and historic preservation laws that
have adverse effects on churches and synagogues).
116. Id. at 531. The Court elaborated in the following paragraph, that "[r]egardless of
the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legisla-
tion, if those terms are to have any meaning." Id. at 532.
117. See infra Part IV.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
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sized that Congress "may legislate without compiling the kind of 'rec-
ord' appropriate with respect to judicial or administrative proceed-
ings." 9 The decision whether to create a legislative record was the
prerogative of Congress, not the courts.
With its decisions in Lopez and City of Boerne, however, the Court
began to suggest that, when considering a statute's constitutionality, it
wanted to find evidence in the legislative history at the time of pas-
sage. In Lopez, the Court first made the boilerplate statement derived
from McClung that "Congress normally is not required to make for-
mal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on inter-
state commerce.""12 Yet the Court then emphasized the usefulness of
such findings when "no such substantial effect was visible to the naked
eye. 12 One wonders why the Court should stop at what is obvious to
the "naked eye." Moreover, in considering the visibility of an effect on
commerce, the Lopez Court would not go beyond the legislative rec-
ord that was compiled by the enacting Congress. In particular, the
Court refused to consider prior federal enactments or congressional
findings on the subject of firearms regulations, because they did not
speak to the precise statute before the Court.'22
Then, in City of Boerne, the Court invoked its somewhat amor-
phous distinction between remedial and substantive legislation to in-
crease the burden on Congress. Once again, the Court recited the tra-
ditional statement about deference to congressional factfinding.'23 Yet
the Boerne Court proceeded to rely on Congress's failure to identify
specific, constitutionally cognizable misconduct by the States in the
legislative history accompanying RFRA.'24
In cases following City of Boerne, the Court has engaged in
broader examination of the legislative record to determine whether
the enacting Congresses adequately justified their constitutional
authority to regulate.'25 Not surprisingly, Congress has lacked a good
enough crystal ball to have created the requisite, precise legislative
histories. Although hints of this development can be found in Lopez
and City of Boerne, it is far more obvious in Kimel v. Florida Board of
119. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,478 (1980).
120. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
121. Id. at 563.
122. Id.
123. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997) ("All must acknowledge that Sec-
tion 5 is a 'positive grant of legislative power' to Congress .... ") (citing Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966)).
124. Id. at 530-31.
125. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
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Regents126 and United States v. Morrison.127 In each case, the Court
sought and was unable to find support in the legislative record under a
legal standard that was unknown at the time the statute was enacted.
A. Kimel
The issue in Kimel was whether Congress properly abrogated the
States' sovereign immunity when it. subjected states to monetary dam-
ages suits by their employees as part of the 1974 amendments to the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). When Congress
amended the ADEA in 1974, it could have thought that such action
was permissible under the Commerce Clause given the 1968 decision
in Maryland v. Wirtz128 upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act as
constitutionally regulating state employees under that clause. Because
employment matters historically have been understood to affect inter-
state commerce substantially, Congress would not have paused to
wonder whether the statute could be justified under the existing con-
stitutional test. Moreover, even if members of Congress had stopped
to consider the constitutionality of authorizing private damages ac-
tions against the States, they would have seen no reason to pepper the
legislative history with explanations of that justification. At most, a
member of Congress who was familiar with the legal requirements of
the time would have thought it important that one could find a justifi-
cation for Congress's actions, not that the record needed to support
such justifications with detailed findings.
Although members of Congress in 1974 might well have justified
abrogating states' immunity from private damages actions in Com-
merce Clause terms, that justification was not available after Seminole
Tribe v. Florida.129 Accordingly, the petitioners and the United States
in Kimel relied on Section 5 as an alternative justification for
Congress's extension of ADEA monetary liability to the States.3 ' The
Court agreed that a Section 5 justification was available in theory, but
then applied its "congruence and proportionality" test from City of
126. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
127. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
128. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
129. The Kimel Court took the Commerce Clause justification entirely off the table with
the statement: "Under our firmly established precedent.., if the ADEA rests solely on
Congress's Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot main-
tain their suits against their state employers." 528 U.S. at 79. Although the Court's reference
to this precedent as "firmly established" is questionable, given the fractured nature of the
Court's views in this area and the recent vintage of the Seminole Tribe decision, the Court
correctly observed that the Commerce Clause justification was not available in the year 2000
to justify the extension of ADEA damages liability to the States in 1974.
130. See Brief for Petitioners, J. Daniel Kimel et al., at 21-44, Kimel (Nos. 98-791, 98-
796); Brief for the United States at 17-49, Kimel (Nos. 98-796, 98-791).
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Boerne to determine whether the ADEA's extension to the States
could be justified under Section 5."' It concluded that the ADEA is
"so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that
it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, un-
constitutional behavior.""13
Despite this sweeping statement of unconstitutionality, the Court
went on to note:
That the ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to be held unconstitu-
tional, while significant, does not alone provide the answer to our § 5 in-
quiry. Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful reme-
dies, and we have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting
reasonably prophylactic legislation. Our task is to determine whether the
ADEA is in fact just such an appropriate remedy or, instead, merely an
attempt to substantively redefine the States' legal obligations with re-
spect to age discrimination. One means by which we have made such a
determination in the past is by examining the legislative record containing
the reasons for Congress' action.133
The Court used the phrase "one means" to describe this inquiry,
but it was, in fact, the only means used to assess whether ADEA ex-
tension was reasonably prophylactic legislation. The Court examined
the ADEA legislative record to determine whether Congress had
identified patterns or practices of age discrimination by state employ-
ers. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, found no such evi-
dence had been presented in congressional hearings or elsewhere in
the legislative history.34 Because Congress lacked a reasonable evi-
dentiary basis for believing prophylactic legislation was needed to ad-
dress States' misconduct, the ADEA was not a valid exercise of
Congress's Section 5 powers.
The Kimel Court's tone in examining the legislative history was
deeply skeptical.3 3 The majority dismissed petitioners' arguments
from the legislative record as no more than "isolated sentences" that
were "cobble[d] together from a decade's worth of congressional re-
ports and floor debates." '36 The Court concluded that the extension of
the ADEA to millions of state government employees was "an unwar-
ranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.' ' 37 In deter-
131. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80-81.
132. Id. at 86 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
133. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 87-89.
135. For related discussion of Kimel's approach toward Congress and its exercise of Sec-
tion 5 powers, see James J. Brudney, The Changing Complexion of Workplace Law: Labor
and Employment Decisions of the Supreme Court's 1999-2000 Term, 16 LAB. LAW. 151, 170-
79 (2000).
136. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90.
137. Id. at 89.
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mining that age discrimination by state employers in the early 1970s
was "perhaps inconsequential,' the Court expressly challenged a key
legislative proponent's floor statements describing employment dis-
crimination against the elderly,'38 and a California legislative study
documenting age discrimination by public agencies.'39
Kimel's skeptical scrutiny of the ADEA legislative record signals a
dramatic change in perspective. The Court in prior decades had sus-
tained Section 5 legislation without expecting Congress to produce the
kind of legislative findings demanded in Kimel 4" Even in City of
Boerne, where Congress's creation of new substantive rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment triggered a closer review of the RFRA legis-
lative record, the Court noted that legislative findings are not typically
required in the Section 5 setting. 4'
The 1974 legislative record admittedly contains few detailed find-
ings of arbitrary age discrimination by state employers. That, however,
is hardly surprising: we have shown that the Court's Section 5 deci-
sions at the time did not encourage - much less demand - the crea-
tion of such a record. Further, the ADEA extension was but a small
part of a larger statute dealing with wage and hour matters. 142 In this
regard, the ADEA legislative record addressing unconstitutional dis-
crimination by state employers is at least comparable to the record
made two years earlier that supported extending Title VII's ban on
gender discrimination to the States.143
138. See id. (questioning validity of Senator Bentsen's statements on the floor that state
and local governments were discriminating against the elderly in their employment prac-
tices).
139. See id. (questioning findings on age discrimination in public agencies reported to
the House in a study commissioned by California legislature).
140. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 (1980) (upholding Congress's power to re-
quire states to pay attorneys' fees in certain circumstances with no reference to congres-
sional findings of a pattern of unconstitutional state conduct); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 652-56, 669 & n.9 (1966) (upholding congressional invalidation of state statutes that
required literacy in English as a condition of voting, based on hypothesized discrimination
against Spanish-speaking minority which dissent noted was without any support in legislative
record).
141. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531-32 (1997).
142. See Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a) (1)-(4), 88 Stat 55, 78-80 (1974) (featuring twenty-
nine sections, of which twenty-eight address FLSA wage and hour issues). Indeed, the legis-
lative history suggests that the omission of government workers from the ADEA seven years
earlier was due primarily to the fact that most government employees were not covered by
the FLSA at that time, and responsibility for ADEA enforcement was to be carried out by
the same agency personnel who enforce the FLSA. See SEN. REP. No. 93-690, at 55 (1974).
143. Compare, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 3651 et al. Before the General Subcommittee on
Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 166-69 (1967) (re-
printing summary of findings from study commissioned by California legislature that recites
specific examples of arbitrary and intentional age discrimination by government employers),
with Hearings on H.R. 1746 Before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 468-69 (1971) (reprinting statement of the
League of Women Voters, asserting that "[p]ersistent and distinct [sex] discriminatory prac-
tices have been found in state and local personnel systems"). See generally H. R. REP. No.
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The absence of a detailed record for fifty States as employers does
not mean Congress acted without rational foundation in 1974. The
voluminous legislative findings of arbitrary discrimination by private
employers were less than a decade old when Congress extended cov-
erage to the States, and half the States still had no age discrimination
laws at all for public employers."' The Court could have developed a
set of reasonable arguments to justify the 1974 extension to state em-
ployees based in part on the widespread evidence available to
Congress about private sector age discrimination. Yet the Court in
Kimel asserted that the ADEA private sector findings were simply ir-
relevant to the posited existence of arbitrary discrimination by state
employers45
This cursory dismissal of a detailed legislative record shows again
how far the newly activist Court has traveled. In the 1960s and 1970s,
when Congress enacted the ADEA and extended its protections to
public employees, arbitrary age discrimination was a pervasive pres-
ence in the white collar workforce, principally among professionals,
managers, and bureaucrats.'46 These occupational categories are
92-238 (1971) (containing no discussion of state employers engaging in sex discrimination);
117 CONG. REc. 31958-85, 32088-114 (1971) (containing no discussion in House floor debate
of state employers engaging in sex discrimination); 118 CONG. REC. 4907-49 (1972) (con-
taining no discussion in Senate floor debate of state employers engaging in sex discrimina-
tion). See also Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n.9 (1977) (discussing
minimal legislative record that accompanied 1972 extension of Title VII to include ban on
religious discrimination).
144. See Brief for Respondents appendix at la-25a, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents. 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (Nos. 98-791, 98-796) (reporting that twenty-four States had no age discrimi-
nation laws applicable to public employers when Congress extended the ADEA).
145. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90-91 (dismissing argument that Congress found substantial age
discrimination in private sector as "beside the point" and "doubt[ing] whether the findings
Congress did make with respect to the private sector could be extrapolated to support a
finding of unconstitutional age discrimination in the public sector").
146. See generally Employment Problems of Older Workers: Hearings on H.R. 274 et
al., Before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., (1965) (containing
nine days of testimony and submissions); Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., (1967)
(containing three days of testimony and submissions); Hearings on H.R. 3651 et al., Before
the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
90th Cong. (1967) (containing twelve days of testimony and submissions); The Older
American Worker- Age Discrimination in Employment, Report of the Secretary of Labor to
the Congress Under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 90-
805, at 2 (1967) (discussing scope of congressional concern for problems of age discrimina-
tion in employment). ADEA litigation typically involved mid-level professionals, salesmen,
and managers. See, e.g., United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (involving airline
pilot); Price v. Md. Cas. Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977) (involving insurance salesman);
Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in
part, and remanded, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979) (involving clothing designer); Coates v.
Nat'l Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977) (involving engineer). Union
strength in the private sector meant that collectively bargained seniority systems provided
substantial protections to millions of older blue collar employees.
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equally if not more prevalent for public employers,'47 and it would
surely have been reasonable for Congress to conclude that state em-
ployers mistreated their older workers in many of the same ways as
private employers.
It is worth emphasizing the crystal ball nature of the Court's deci-
sion. The 1974 Congress was acting pursuant to a settled understand-
ing under which civil rights legislation could be justified based on both
Section 5 and the Commerce Clause. There simply was no reason in
1974 to generate a lengthy legislative record demonstrating that state
and local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against
their employees on the basis of age. The fact that it took the Court
twenty-six years to evolve to the position that the ADEA was uncon-
stitutional in subjecting states to monetary damages suits by their em-
ployees says more about ideological changes on the Supreme Court
than "attitudinal" changes in Congress.
As a policymaking body, Congress legislates repeatedly in areas of
national concern such as age discrimination in employment. Commit-
tees and members draw on their institutional and individual experi-
ences to justify more efficient lawmaking without resorting to redun-
dant hearings or extended debate. To regard the brief 1974 legislative
history as the entire "record" underlying the ADEA's extension "is
essentially... [to] treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court,"
and thereby to "erect an artificial barrier to full understanding of the
legislative process."' 48 By creating a rigid and narrow requirement for
how Congress must justify ADEA extension in the 1974 legislative re-
cord, the Court required a degree of legislative omniscience that is
highly troubling as a matter of constitutional discourse between the
branches.
B. Morrison
The crystal ball methodology is also apparent in Morrison. The is-
sue in Morrison was the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which
provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated
violence. This provision is part of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994, enacted by Congress a year before the Supreme Court decided
147. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (involving mid-level manager in
state agency); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving public school
teacher). In 1979, state and local governments employed nearly 2.8 million administrators,
professionals, technicians, paraprofessionals, and office/clerical workers, comprising 60.9%
of their combined workforce. In 1997, these five categories of white collar workers com-
prised 63.3% of the state and local government workforce, a total of 3.3 million employees.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1999, at 339 (119th ed. 1999); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1981, at 308 (102d ed. 1981).
148. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,502 (1980) (Powell J. concurring).
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Lopez. Christy Brzonkala brought suit against Antonio Morrison and
James Crawford after university officials took no punitive action
against the men despite allegations that they had raped her and used
sexually offensive language. The Fourth Circuit, on a divided vote en
banc, held that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact
§ 13981's civil remedy under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'49
The Supreme Court began its investigation of the constitutionality
of § 13981 with boilerplate language about deference to Congress.15
Nonetheless, the Court soon turned to an excerpt from the decision in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'51 that it had also quoted in
Lopez: The interstate commerce power should not be "extended so as
to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effec-
tively obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government.' ',5 That quota-
tion, however, ignores the thrust of the opinion in Jones & Laughlin,
which was pivotal in returning the Court to its posture of deference to
congressional action. The Jones & Laughlin Court had found two
prior decisions not to be "controlling" authority, in order to conclude
that Congress had acted lawfully when it created a comprehensive na-
tional system for regulating labor-management relations. The Court's
holding there was more consistent with a different statement in its
majority opinion - "The fundamental principle is that the power to
regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation'
for 'its protection and advancement' ,9153 - than with the minor caveat
quoted by the Court in both Lopez and Morrison. Yet, the Morrison
Court amplified its rationale from Lopez by making the Court, not
Congress, the appropriate authority to determine what kind of legisla-
tion is needed to protect the national interest.
149. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (6-4
decision in which four members of the court joined Judge Luttig's opinion, Judge Neimeyer
concurred separately, and three members joined Judge Motz's dissent). Unlike Lopez, the
Morrison case dealt with Congress's authority to enact a civil rather than a criminal remedy.
Section 13981(a) stated that Congress had authority to enact this provision under Section 5
and the Commerce Clause. For a thoughtful discussion of the Morrison Court's Section 5
holding in more traditional federalism terms, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Essay,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel,
110 YALE L.J. 441,473-86 (2000).
150. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Due respect for the decisions
of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enact-
ment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.").
151. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
152. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57
(1995) (quoting Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37)).
153. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-37 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557, 564 (1870)).
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Like the 1974 Congress extending ADEA coverage to public em-
ployment, the 1994 Congress would have had little reason to doubt the
constitutionality of its work in creating for women a private right of
action against perpetrators of violence. The Court, however, held
§ 13981 to the test that it formulated in Lopez; indeed, it expanded the
nature of that test. First, the Court asserted that there must be proof
that the regulated activity was economic in character and recast its
prior decisions under that previously unannounced principle.154 Sec-
ond, the Court noted, as it had in Lopez for the first time, that a juris-
dictional element - such as a requirement that the gun crossed state
boundaries in interstate commerce - may establish that Congress
acted pursuant to its commerce powers. 5 The 1994 Congress had no
reason to foresee that an explicit jurisdictional element might be suffi-
cient to establish valid Commerce Clause authority; thus, that element
was lacking from the legislation. Finally, the Court observed that "ex-
press congressional findings" in the legislative history could demon-
strate constitutionality.156 It repeated the Lopez "naked eye" standard:
that legislative findings can save legislation when the effect on inter-
state commerce is not visible to the naked eye.157
As in Kimel, the Morrison Court treated Congress like a lower
court, refusing to extrapolate from its findings to fit the proper consti-
tutional standard. The legislative record contained substantial evi-
dence of unconstitutional gender bias in twenty-one States.158 The
Court expressed concern that such findings, from only twenty-one of
the fifty States, were not sufficient as evidence of a national prob-
lem.159
154. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-11. See infra text accompanying notes 162-166 for further
discussion of this point.
155. Id. at 611-12. Some prior laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, such as
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, had included a jurisdictional requirement. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1994) ("Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a
place of public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect
commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action."). Others,
however, had not, such as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994).
156. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (quoting Brief for the
United States at 5-6, Lopez (No. 93-1260))).
157. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563).
158. Id. at 629-31 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Passage of the Act in 1994 was preceded by
four years of hearings, which included testimony from physicians and law professors; from
survivors of rape and domestic violence; and from representatives of state law enforcement
and private business. The record includes reports on gender bias from task forces in 21
States, and we have the benefit of specific factual findings in the eight separate Reports is-
sued by Congress and its committees over the long course leading to enactment.").
159. Id. at 626 (observing that "Congress' findings indicate that the problem of discrimi-
nation against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all states, or even
most states"); see id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to documented constitutional
violations by twenty-one States, adding "[t]he record nowhere reveals a congressional find-
ing that the problem 'does not exist' elsewhere.").
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Unlike Lopez, the Court was not faced with an empty congres-
sional record in Morrison. As the Court acknowledged, there was evi-
dence of the "serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on
victims and their families."'" Congress found that gender-motivated
violence affected interstate commerce:
[B]y deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging
in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business,
and in places involved in interstate commerce ... [,] by diminishing na-
tional productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing
the supply of and demand for interstate products.
1 6
'
This evidence, however, was not the right sort of evidence because
it followed the "but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of
violent crime.., to every attenuated effect upon interstate com-
merce." 162 The Court criticized Congress's attempt at record building
as flowing from a flawed "method of reasoning.'
'1 63
Although the Morrison Court found this evidence unworthy, it was
arguably precisely the type of evidence approved by the Court in the
past. In Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court deferred to a legislative
record that included anecdotal discussion of the costs associated with
racial segregation as well as evidence regarding race-based differen-
tials in family expenditures based on the reduced mobility of black
families. 64 Congress in 1994 had compiled a far weightier record iden-
160. Id. at 614.
161. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
Nor was the evidence of a national problem limited to the mathematical minority of states
referred to by the Court above. For instance, the record included a letter signed by the at-
torneys-general from thirty-eight states, requesting Congress to enact VAWA because "the
problem of violence against women is a national one, requiring federal attention." See Letter
from Robert Abrams et al., Attorney General of New York, to Jack Brooks, Chair House
Judiciary Committee, reprinted in Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judici-
ary, 103d Cong. 34-36 (1993).
162. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. Congress could perhaps have done a more artful job in
explaining why § 13981 and its national antidiscrimination protections were appropriate
when it created its legislative record. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Third Translation of
the Commerce Clause: Congressional Power to Regulate Social Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1206, 1214 (1998) (arguing that there is "a loss in our failure to articulate national val-
ues other than commerce" in judicial review of congressional action). Even under Professor
Merritt's approach, the Court could offer instructions to Congress on what type of evidence
might support its authority to regulate social problems. The Court, however, did not walk
down that path. Instead, it took away the power from Congress altogether with the assertion
that these matters "can be settled finally only by this Court," seemingly without opportunity
for input from Congress. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (internal citation omitted).
163. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
164. See Civil Rights - Public Accommodations, Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., App. V, pp. 1383-1387 (1963) (documenting "illustra-
tive examples, as reported in newspapers and periodicals, of economic impact resulting from
resistance to segregation practices"); H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 9-10 (1963) (additional
views on H.R. 7152 of Hon. William M. McCulloch, Hon. John V. Lindsay, Hon. William T.
Cahill, Hon. Garner E. Shriver, Hon. Clark MacGregor, Hon. Charles MeC. Mathias, Hon.
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tifying (in anecdotal and systemic terms) the costs associated with
gender-based violence, including costs stemming from reduced mobil-
ity by women.16
The Court rewrote the Commerce Clause test from a "substantial
effect on interstate commerce" to an "economic activity" test. The
Court did so by reexamining and even reshaping the language and
holding in Lopez, emphasizing that the economic aspect of the regu-
lated activity was central to holdings in prior decisions that Congress
had not exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause.166 Congress
thought it needed to document the effect on interstate commerce
when it really needed to document that the activity being regulated
was economic in nature. Once again, this is a crystal ball problem -
the Court not deferring to its coequal branch because the enacting
Congress had failed to create a legislative record that could satisfy a
hitherto unannounced legal standard.
C. Implications
The Court's approach represents a serious challenge to the way
Congress legislates. The Court is in effect directing Congress to hold
focused hearings and to gather comprehensive evidence that will pro-
vide ample support for the existence of a national problem address-
able under Congress's enumerated powers. The Court's new height-
ened review of the legislative record has transformed Congress's role
James E. Bromwell) (documenting the cost of an illustrative trip from Washington, D.C., to
Miami, Florida, and from Washington, D.C., to New Orleans, Louisiana, showing location of
hotel-motel accommodations of "reasonable" quality readily available to Negroes); H.R.
Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2 at tbl. I (documenting the average family expenditure for admissions,
food eaten away from home, and automobile operations, for three income classes, large,
northern and southern cities, by race, 1950).
165. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631-33 (Souter, J., dissenting) (reciting results from nu-
merous studies, including a sharp reduction in women participating in commercial activities
alone in evening due to fear of rape).
166. Lopez seemed to view the substantial effects test as key. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) ("We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case
law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially
affects' interstate commerce." (emphasis added)). But in Morrison, the Court stated that
"the pattern of analysis is clear... Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained." 529 U.S. at 610 (emphasis
added). By contrast, the Court noted that when the regulated activity is noneconomic in
character, it is unlikely to find that Congress acted within its commerce powers. Hence, "a
fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue
was central to our decision in that case .... Lopez's review of Commerce Clause case law
demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate
activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in
question has been some sort of economic endeavor." Id. at 610; see A. Christopher Bryant &
Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New 'On the Record'
Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 341-44 (2001) (discuss-
ing how Morrison decision converted Lopez into an economic activity test).
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from a coequal branch warranting judicial deference to an entity
charged with extensive factfinding responsibilities.
One possible response, of course, is to ask what is so bad about
such a dynamic between the branches. Since Lopez was decided, a
number of legal scholars have maintained that the requirement of
adequate legislative findings can promote more thoughtful national
laws and enhance interbranch cooperation.167 "[I]f carefully applied
and thoughtfully limited, [the Lopez decision] could promote a
meaningful dialogue between judiciary and legislature concerning just
where the difficult-to-draw lines should exist concerning important
constitutional values of personal equality and federalism."' 65
Such arguments presuppose a basic judicial faith in the enterprise
of building a legislative record. By emphasizing the importance of de-
tailed and comprehensive legislative history as a justification for con-
gressional power, the Court presumably seeks to add new value to the
exchanges between itself and Congress on public policy matters and to
improve the quality of those federal laws that are enacted by Congress
as appropriate national solutions. The fact that the Court has found
Congress's efforts thus far uniformly unsatisfactory could simply mean
that Congress must do more to adapt to the new rigor associated with
legislative record building. Yet it is also possible that the Court's crys-
tal ball approach reflects a different, less constructive attitude regard-
ing Congress and its methods of legislating.
While we agree that it is generally a positive development for
Congress to create a record in support of legislation, we do not believe
the Court should be micromanaging when and how that record is de-
veloped.169 It is not enough to insist that the Court intrude into
167. See, e.g. Philip P. Frickey, Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 697 (1996); Barry
Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signs: A Positive Political Reading of United
States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 760 (1996); Jackson, supra note 79, at 2237,
2240; Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 947 (1999). These proceduralist arguments, often advanced by
advocates of a liberal legal process approach (Frickey, Friedman, Jackson), are distinct from
substantive arguments that the Court's new conservatism is right on the merits. See, e.g.,
Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995); Lino A. Graglia, United States v.
Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 746 (1996).
168. Frickey, supra note 167, at 729; see also Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an
Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 734
(1996) ("Required findings represent a less intrusive step than full-fledged review, and -
despite the drawbacks - may facilitate a collaborative effort to develop constitutional prin-
ciples in contexts in which independent judicial rules are normatively unattractive.").
169. The Constitution, of course, does require Congress to keep a record of its pro-
ceedings. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceed-
ings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment
require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal."). Were
Congress to fail to comply with that requirement entirely, we would agree that intervention
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Congress's affairs in a way that is "carefully applied and thoughtfully
limited.""17 The kind of intrusion that began in Lopez is inherently
problematic, because telling Congress how to perform its information-
gathering functions misunderstands and subverts the legislative pro-
cess in four significant ways.
1. The Rich Informality of Information-Gathering
The Court's approach fails to appreciate the skill and sophistica-
tion that Congress brings to the information-gathering process.
Congress educates itself not just through structured record evidence
but through a range of informal contacts - including local meetings
with constituents, ex parte contacts between members (or staff) and
lobbyists, and exchanges with executive branch representatives.1 This
institutional virtue, the capacity to gather and evaluate information in
both structured and informal settings, contributes to a distinctive Sec-
tion 5 role for Congress. When it enacted the ADEA, Congress
amassed a powerful record illustrating the pervasive nature of age-
based stereotypes and discriminatory generalizations in the American
workplace. 172 Its statutory response, which seeks to prohibit and deter
such arbitrary employer conduct, applies in the public sector not only
to laws enacted by state legislatures but also to more individualized
and even routine decisionmaking by personnel managers, supervisors
and government agencies.173 More than three decades after the
is appropriate. But if Congress does not regulate in the area of suspect classes or fundamen-
tal rights, if it keeps a record of its proceedings, and if the record discloses a rational basis for
legislative action, then we believe the Court should have little further role in monitoring the
constitutional quality or quantity of that record.
170. Frickey, supra note 167, at 729.
171. See JOSEPH M. BESETrE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 50-51,152, 178 (1994) (discussing
importance of informal information-sharing by lobbyists and executive branch officials);
WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 327-28
(9th ed. 1997) (reporting that most lobbyists regard personal presentation of their issue to a
single legislator as more effective than testifying at committee hearing); Allen Schick, In-
formed Legislation: Policy Research Versus Ordinary Knowledge, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER
AND THE CONGRESS 99 (William H. Robinson & Clay H. Wellborn eds., 1991) (observing
that "advice and ideas flow in [to Congress] from diverse sources" including constituent
complaints, local news items and editorials, government agency reports, and private meet-
ings with lobbyists and others who have privileged access, as well as expert testimony at
committee hearings, and that "[aill these sources are grist for the legislative mill"); see also
Bryant & Simeone, supra note 166, at 384-87 (describing Congress's less formal information-
gathering channels, and explaining that "absent circumstances indicating corruption or brib-
ery, these kinds of off-the-record communications are not only legally permissible but consti-
tutionally protected").
172. See supra note 146 (citing to extensive legislative record).
173. See, e.g., Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983);
Johnson v. Mayor & City Council, 637 F. Supp. 903, 907 (D. Md. 1986). State legislative rules
sanctioning the arbitrariness of mandatory retirement have survived rational basis review,
but the Equal Protection Clause need not as a result permit individual state employers to
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ADEA's enactment, common sense and social science research sup-
port Congress's initial conclusions that arbitrary stereotypes and gen-
eralizations - not hostile or negative feelings towards older people -
are at the root of unequal treatment in the workplace.'74 The Court in
Kimel was unwilling to accord meaningful recognition to Congress's
special legislative competence in identifying this threat to equality and
then acting to limit its consequences.
The recent Garrett decision highlights the Court's unwillingness to
recognize or respect how Congress educates itself about matters of
public concern. In developing comprehensive legislation to protect in-
dividuals with disabilities from public and private discrimination,
Congress relied not only on extensive direct testimony and decades of
prior legislative experience regulating on this same subject,'75 but also
on a Task Force that it created specifically to assess the need for new
national disability discrimination legislation.'76 Yet when it concluded
that Congress did not adequately document the existence of disability
discrimination in state employment, the Court questioned the rele-
vance of the evidence compiled from all fifty States by this Task Force,
because the evidence of disparate treatment by state officials was
submitted to the Task Force rather than directly to Congress. 77 In ad-
dition, the Task Force and various Congressional committees collected
evidence about discrimination by cities and counties as well as states.
The Court, however, refused to extrapolate from this evidence of dis-
crimination by units of local government, because principles of sover-
eign immunity do not apply to these units of local government.178
At the time it enacted the ADA, Congress had little reason to
foresee any constitutional requirement for detailed record building,
given that Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne were six or more years in
the future. But even if it had anticipated a need for more extensive
evidentiary support, Congress in 1990 could not possibly have fore-
invoke such stereotypes and generalizations whenever they fix terms and conditions of em-
ployment for older workers.
174. See Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where
It's Been, Where It Is Today, Where It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 618-20, 677-84
(1997). See generally Linda H. Krieger, The Contents of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995); Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Discrimination: Research Agenda for the
Twenty-First Century, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 319 (2000).
175. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 976-77, at Appendices A and B (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(listing thirteen congressional hearings on ADA during 101st Congress (1989-90) and nine
prior federal statutes, enacted between 1948 and 1988, addressing discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities by public and private entities).
176. See id. at 977-93, Appendix C (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing submissions made to
Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities by individuals and
organizations from fifty States).
177. Id. at 966.
178. Id. at 965.
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seen that its historic methods of educating itself outside the formalities
of the hearing room, or its reliance on evidence of discrimination en-
gaged in by closely analogous government actors at the local level,
would be excluded from consideration when that record was being re-
viewed.
2. Political Accountability
The Court's approach is further flawed in that it overlooks the im-
portant democracy-based aspects of information gathering. When
Congress builds a legislative record in the context of its political rela-
tionship to the electorate, it is not only (or even primarily) seeking to
compile an evidentiary foundation for purposes of judicial review. In
addition, Congress seeks to inform the public (and key interested sub-
groups), thereby helping to shape public discourse.'79 It also tries to re-
spond to agendas promoted by these same interest groups, thereby re-
acting constructively and responsibly to the problems that groups
identify. There are, in short, political dimensions when members of
Congress promote, or oppose, a given legislative proposal. The busi-
ness of trying both to influence and to anticipate the public makes for
messy and unpredictable legislative history. At the same time, this dy-
namic and regularly recorded tension between Congress and its con-
stituencies contributes importantly to the legitimacy of the lawmaking
process, and helps explain the presumption of judicial deference to the
final product. The Court's insistence on a type of pristine "substantial
evidence" approach slights another of Congress's distinctive institu-
tional virtues - the politically accountable nature of its record build-
ing enterprise.
This fact - that congressional record building leading to legisla-
tive enforcement is democratic whereas judicial review, especially
strict scrutiny review of statutes, is the opposite 8 ' - points toward an
additional weakness in the Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence.
When the Court in earlier ADEA decisions eschewed heightened
179. See, e.g., BESETTE, supra note 171, at 57-63 (discussing importance of bargaining
among members and interested groups as factor in congressional policymaking); id at 236-45
(discussing use of political rhetoric as form of civic instruction in development of delibera-
tive majorities); KEEFE & OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 339-40 (8th ed.
1993) (discussing ways in which members of Congress influence lobbyists on policy matters);
Bryant & Simeone, supra note 166, at 384, 387-88 (discussing the informing function of
Congress).
180. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (contrasting legislature's
"broad discretion to classify" under "traditional equal protection principles" with the judici-
ary's closer scrutiny of laws that classify based on alienage); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that "prejudice against discrete and insular mi-
norities [may] tend[] seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and ... may [therefore] call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry").
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scrutiny and upheld statutes that mandatorily retired police officers,
judges, and foreign service employees, it was effectively deferring to
legislative limits placed on groups with adequate access to the political
process.'81 This deference reflected in part the Court's understanding
that its own role under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 1"2 is
fundamentally antidemocratic and should be invoked with caution.
It is quite another matter, however, for the Court to apply such
reservations to Congress's politically accountable role under Section 5.
Yet that is what the Kimel Court in essence did by prohibiting
Congress from authorizing private damages actions to prevent or deter
arbitrary state conduct against older persons who are not sufficiently
"discrete and insular" to warrant strict scrutiny protection from the
judiciary. In contrast to the Court, Congress is not an unaccountable
"superlegislature"' 13 when it engages in broad-based factfinding re-
garding the existence of arbitrary age discrimination in the national
workplace. Assuming that evidence of discrimination and lack of po-
litical access are not sufficiently stark to warrant heightened scrutiny
under Section 1, it should not follow that Congress is precluded consti-
tutionally from extending important protection against government
discrimination under Section 5.
3. Opportunity Costs
Redirecting Congress's way of doing business also imposes sub-
stantial opportunity costs on the legislative enterprise. Enactment of
federal legislation is a complex process that requires investing consid-
erable institutional resources and negotiating politically sensitive in-
ternal procedures. The implicit message in the Court's crystal ball ap-
proach is that Congress should simply do things better next time. Such
a message, however, fails to acknowledge how resource-intensive the
next time is likely to be. Consider, for example, how often important
substantive provisions are enacted as part of larger bills under consid-
eration by Congress. The Violence Against Women Act and the Gun-
Free School Zones Act each were part of omnibus crime bills. Simi-
larly, the extension of the ADEA to the States was part of a much
larger revision of the FLSA in 1974. It is highly unlikely that extensive
hearings and lengthy reports will be produced on every aspect of such
181. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 498 U.S. 1079 (1991) (state judges); Vance v. Bradley 440
U.S. 93 (1979) (foreign service employees); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
(police officers).
182. Section 1 provides in part: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
183. The term "superlegislature" was used by Justice Harlan in expressing concern
about the Court's extension of its Section 1 authority. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Post & Siegel, supra note 149, at 463-64 (discussing
tensions between roles of Court and Congress under Fourteenth Amendment).
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large bills. Guided by its sense of which provisions are especially com-
plicated or controversial, Congress makes decisions about how to allo-
cate its limited resources. With no strong outcry from the minority
party that any of these measures unconstitutionally impinges on states'
sovereignty, one should hardly expect that Congress will devote exten-
sive resources to documenting their constitutionality. Yet the Court
discusses each measure as if Congress's sole focus during legislative
debate were on these discrete provisions embedded in larger pieces of
legislation.
By insisting that Congress take more time to build a lower court or
agency-type record in Section 5 and Commerce Clause settings, the
Court restricts the amount of other legislative work that Congress can
accomplish.1" That structural constraint on Congress's legislative ca-
pacity may be viewed as a positive policy development by some, but it
is not policy-neutral. The Court's effort to dictate, and thereby to re-
strict, Congress's agenda is a further manifestation of disrespect.
4. Normative Ramifications
Finally, and implicit in our descriptive account of the Court's in-
sensitivity to the nature of congressional operations, this crystal ball
approach raises larger normative issues. As a general matter, both liti-
gants and citizens planning future conduct under our rule-of-law re-
gime are remitted to the crystal ball due to the possibility that a court
will reverse or modify a prior interpretation after they have acted.
Congress, historically and institutionally, has enjoyed a different status
when its actions are subjected to judicial review. The legislation
Congress enacts is presumed to be legitimate as the product of a co-
equal branch that formulates national policy under independent
sources of constitutional law. For private parties, the crystal ball
problem would be solved in theory if the Court's decisions were not
retroactive. That result, however, would not address the problem of
judicially invalidated exercises of congressional authority. The Court's
changing rules do not simply adjust the prospective behavior of pri-
vate individuals; they erode the processes and powers of a constitu-
tional partner.
It is a commonplace to observe that legislatures and courts make
law in quite different, though comparably legitimate, ways. While the
184. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (1994) (maintaining that
"the opportunities for Congress to act are limited in predictable ways by the finite quantity
of temporal and political resources and by substantial logistical and procedural con-
straints... [and] in unpredictable ways by the ebb and flow of public attention, interest
group commitment, and intensity of member preferences[, the result being that] when
Congress devotes more time to one legislative item, it sacrifices the opportunity to address
other items on the legislative agenda").
October 2001]
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 121 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
Court responds only to discrete cases or controversies, Congress plays
a more proactive role on a broad policymaking stage. In fulfilling its
legislative responsibilities, Congress relies on a special institutional
competence that stems in important respects from being uncon-
strained by the agendas or evidentiary presentations of individual liti-
gants. As indicated above, Congress has the capacity to recognize and
act upon "legislative facts," '85 including policy-related facts that are
not part of any formal record, and also to consider a range of politi-
cally sensitive enforcement options and techniques in its effort to pro-
duce an effective accommodation of competing interests."8 These
strategies reflect Congress's more general ability to draw upon the
extra-record knowledge, experience, and judgment of its collective
membership as the foundation for legislative action.'87
In its Section 5 and Commerce Clause decisions, the Rehnquist
Court has effectively sought to reshape these lawmaking processes by
imposing an "adjudicatory fact"'88 model based on its own institutional
experiences. Traditionally, the Court has been attentive to Congress's
expertise and judgment in perceiving and reporting the pervasiveness
of discriminatory practices or the substantiality of interstate commerce
effects. By contrast, the level of precision and detail in the formal leg-
islative record that the current Court requires is more akin to the fac-
tual predicate needed to support a class action claim for constitutional
relief. Even if it were a roadmap to constitutional validation for future
statutes, this new approach would raise serious separation of powers
concerns. In undervaluing, if not ignoring, essential elements of the
legislative enterprise, the Court's approach cannot help but impede
Congress's ability to fulfill its distinct responsibilities.
In the end, the Court in Kimel and Garrett demanded that
Congress prove something to justify its exercise of Section 5 powers
against the States, a considerable departure from expectations of
185. See generally Kenneth Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Admin-
istrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942) (distinguishing between "legislative
facts," which "inform... legislative judgment... [when an agency] wrestles with a question
of law or policy" and "adjudicative facts," which "concern only the parties to a particular
case").
186. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519,
551-58 (1988) (discussing the distinctive institutional qualities of courts and legislatures, and
emphasizing that legislatures are better able than courts to control their own agendas, to in-
vestigate issues in detail, to develop imaginative remedies, and to monitor results and revise
solutions).
187. See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 105 (1966) (dis-
cussing distinctive legislative capacity to act on basis of members' expertise and experience
without relying on formal record evidence).
188. See Davis, supra note 185. See generally William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro,
Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (critiquing Court's reliance
on concept of a "legislative record" in light of administrative law principles).
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Congress under the civil rights cases of the 1960s and 1970s."5 9 Indeed,
the earlier decisions suggest both that Congress should play a positive
role in strengthening the antidiscrimination norms of the Fourteenth
Amendment 90 and that Congress's legislative efforts can support the
Court's own evolving approach to understanding and enforcing those
norms outside the racial setting.1 9 The Court in the last decade has
largely abandoned this deferential stance, replacing it with a more
constrained vision in which Congressional factfinding and support for
antidiscrimination laws are subject to searching, skeptical review.
Congress's unsurprising inability to keep pace with such a remarkable
change in perspective has produced a troubling shift in the balance of
power between the branches.
III. PHANTOMS
Even when legislation enacted by Congress seems to be supported
by considerable legislative findings, the Court has not been satisfied. It
appears at times that the Court has transformed questions of fact for
Congress into questions of law for the Court's determination. In this
regard, the Court's rigorous approach to the legislative history may be
windowdressing for a phantom legislative record requirement.
A. Kimel
The crystal ball assessment of the Kimel decision is in some ways a
benign portrayal of the Court's analysis, because it accepts at face
value that the Court would entertain a suitably justified congressional
response to the problem of age discrimination. A phantom analysis of
Kimel's holding is less flattering in that it questions the genuineness of
the Court's assertion. Despite its claims of purported deference to
189. Similarly, the Court in Lopez and Morrison required Congress to establish far
more in the way of a nexus to commerce than had been demanded in Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence of the late 1930s and the 1960s.
190. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966) (holding that to construe
Section 5 as requiring prior judicial invalidation of the state conduct being regulated by
Congress "would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsi-
bility for implementing the Amendment," and that Congress's power under Section 5 goes
beyond "merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the 'majestic gen-
eralities' of § 1 of the Amendment"); Cox, supra note 187, at 118-21 (1966) (suggesting that
equal protection standards may at times be enforced more effectively by Congress than by
the courts); Post & Siegel, supra note 149, at 498-500 (discussing historical development and
importance of Court's Section 5 approach in Morgan).
191. See Post & Siegel, supra note 149, at 520 (recounting how Court's plurality opinion
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973), relied on congressional legislation in
gender discrimination area to inform and support its emerging view that sex-based classifica-
tions require intermediate scrutiny under Section 1); id. at 504 (discussing how Court viewed
antidiscrimination statutes of 1960s as implementing the equality norms of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and this view allowed Court readily to approve Congress's extension of Title
VII to the States as appropriate Section 5 legislation in late 1970s).
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Congress's factfinding, a phantom assessment suggests that no amount
of factfinding by Congress could pass muster.
The decision in Kimel can be viewed as fitting the phantom cate-
gory, because the Court has implicitly suggested that Congress does
not have the authority to enact any legislation under Section 5 to pro-
tect groups that are entitled only to rational basis review under Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.192 Congress lacks such authority
once the Court has restricted the "congruence and proportionality"
test from City of Boerne to mean that Congress's legislative powers
under Section 5 are no greater than the Court's power to invalidate
state action under Section V"
In City of Boerne, the Court held that there is an important distinc-
tion between remedial legislation and legislation that results in a "sub-
stantive change in the governing law." It created the "congruence and
proportionality" test to evaluate whether legislation was appropriately
limited to Congress's remedial authority. The Court recognized that
the distinction "between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitu-
tional actions and measures that make substantive change in the gov-
erning law is not easy to discern," '194 but it fashioned its new approach
in an arguably deferential framework when it stated that "Congress
must have wide latitude in determining where [the distinction] lies.' 195
With hindsight, one can see that the City of Boerne test left
Congress little room to enact legislation to protect nonsuspect groups
or to enforce nonfundamental rights96 despite the purported defer-
ence to Congress. RFRA failed the congruence and proportionality
test because the statute banned far more conduct than would be un-
constitutional under the lenient standards applied in the free exercise
192. Throughout this section, we use terms like "implicitly suggested," because we ac-
knowledge that our argument does not directly follow from the language of the Court's deci-
sion. Our argument here is based on speculation and inference rather than on the plain lan-
guage of the majority opinion.
193. In City of Boerne, the Court held that Congress may enact remedial, but not "sub-
stantive," legislation under its Section 5 powers. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519
(1997) ("The Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms the remedial, rather than substan-
tive, nature of the Enforcement Clause.").
194. Id.
195. Id. at 520.
196. The Court's decisions in Kimel and Garrett assessed congressional enforcement of
nonsuspect classes under Section l's Equal Protection Clause. The Court's decisions from
the 1999 Term invalidating patent and trademark laws that regulated the States each in-
volved Congress enforcing nonfundamental property rights under Section l's Due Process
Clause. The Court in those cases did not go so far as to say that Congress has no authority
whatsoever to protect nonfundamental rights under Section 1. See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). Rather, it stated that: "Congress
came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part of the States." Id. at 640.
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area for neutral legislation."9 The Court suggested that legislation
must be limited to situations in which there was evidence that the
banned conduct had "been motivated by religious bigotry." 98 Broader
legislation would have to be justified under strict or intermediate scru-
tiny.199 No amount of legislative factfinding would appear to be able to
cure this defect in the legal standard. °
The decision in Kimel clarified the narrow nature of Congress's
power to enact legislation when dealing with nonsuspect groups or
nonfundamental rights. As in City of Boerne, the Court compared the
scope of the actions that were made unlawful under the federal legisla-
tion with the Court's prior holdings concerning what kind of conduct
has been found to be unconstitutional in the subject area. Assessing its
previous decisions, the Court concluded that the "Constitution permits
States to draw lines on the basis of age when they have a rational basis
for doing so at a class-based level, even if it 'is probably not true' that
those reasons are valid in the majority of cases."2 ' The Court's earlier
deference to state legislative judgments was hardly the virtual invita-
tion to arbitrary treatment that Kimel described. °2 Measured against
197. "Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test,
say one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching
judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation." City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 534.
198. "In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are not ones which will have
been motivated by religious bigotry." Id. at 535.
199. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that laws of general
applicability which created an incidental burden of religious exercise were not unconstitu-
tional absent direct evidence of religious animus).
200. As the Court stated:
Regardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be considered remedial, pre-
ventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to
a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
201. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) (emphasis added); see id. at 83-
84 (discussing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-73 (1991) (holding that mandatory re-
tirement of state judges is not violative of Equal Protection Clause); Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 98-112 (1979) (holding that mandatory retirement of foreign service employees does
not violate equal protection component of Fifth Amendment); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976) (holding that mandatory retirement of state police does not vio-
late Equal Protection Clause)).
202. See, e.g., Vance, 440 U.S. at 101, 103 (relying on critical foreign policy role played
by foreign service employees, and also hazards and wear and tear of extended overseas duty,
in upholding mandatory retirement); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314-15 nn.7-8 (relying on arduous
physical challenges facing uniformed police in upholding mandatory retirement). Lower
courts have rightly understood that they can invalidate age discrimination by state agencies
on rational basis grounds after Murgia and Vance. See, e.g., Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993,
996-97 (7th Cir. 1997) (invalidating mandatory retirement of public school teachers); Indus.
Claim Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 66-70 (Colo. 1996) (invalidating state's refusal
to pay workers' compensation benefits for permanent total disability beyond age sixty-five).
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this Kimel test, however, it is not surprising that a broad ban on age
discrimination in public employment "prohibits substantially more
state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis
standard." '203
Although the Kimel Court claimed to leave room for Congress to
enact remedial legislation for a group that only receives rational basis
treatment under Section 1,"° it is hard to imagine what kind of evi-
dence could have justified such prophylactic legislation. The Court
noted that Congress "never identified.., any discrimination whatso-
ever that rose to the level of constitutional violation."2 5 Because the
States have the power (according to the Court) to draw age-based
lines "even if it 'is probably not true' that those reasons are valid in
the majority of cases,"2 6 the examples of state line-drawing on the ba-
sis of age were not - and seemingly could not have been - evidence
of unconstitutionally arbitrary state action. Accordingly, Congress
"has no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was nec-
essary in this field."2 7
Having determined that there was no evidence in support of the
need for any legislation, the Court did not have to consider the ques-
tion of what would be the permissible language of legislation that pro-
portionally responded to such a problem. Given its statement about
the constitutional power of states to create and apply age-based dis-
tinctions, the Court probably would have required that the
Congressional response include evidence of animus as well as arbi-
trariness. That is an unlikely legislative response for several reasons.
First, because age discrimination is fundamentally about arbitrary
stereotypes, not invidious hostility to old people," 8 Congress is un-
likely to be able to find substantial evidence addressing the presence
of animus. Second, Congress would be hard-pressed to amass such
animus-related evidence (even if it existed) against a politically potent
constituency of public employers when it has never done so against
private employers in the first place. Finally, an animus standard is not
the kind of response we expect from Congress when it legislates in the
civil law area. Congress in its prophylactic role seeks to articulate
broad standards that can apply to classes of individuals; an animus
203. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
204. "That the ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to be held unconstitutional,
while significant, does not alone provide the answer to our § 5 inquiry. Difficult and intrac-
table problems often require powerful remedies, and we have never held that § 5 precludes
Congress from enacting reasonably prophylactic legislation." Id. at 88.
205. id. at 89.
206. See supra note 201.
207. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
208. See supra note 174 (discussing findings of legal and social science scholars).
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standard is more individualized and not likely to bar more conduct
than is already barred under background constitutional norms. It
makes little sense for Congress to invest its legislative capital on
merely repeating what is already unconstitutional under existing law.
The Kimel decision may thus be understood as holding that
Congress has no power to enact remedial legislation under Section 5
for a group that is only subject to rational basis scrutiny, because it is
highly unlikely that any such legislation would merely ban conduct
that was "irrational" for Section 1 purposes. The "proportionality and
congruence" test has arguably come to mean that Congress's powers
under Section 5 are coextensive with the Court's authority to declare
government conduct unconstitutional under Section 1. Moreover, the
Court strongly implied that there is no such thing as unconstitutionally
irrational age discrimination at the hands of the States.
The Garrett decision is more explicit in its suggestion that
Congress's powers under Section 5 extend no further than the Court's
authority to declare government conduct unconstitutional. In their
separate concurrence, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor stated:
If the States had been transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment by their
mistreatment or lack of concern for those with impairments, one would
have expected to find in decisions of the courts of the States and also the
courts of the United States extensive litigation and discussion of the con-
stitutional violations. This confirming judicial documentation does not
exist.
2 9
But "confirming judicial documentation" would only be required if
Congress's Section 5 authority is coextensive with the Court's author-
ity under Section 1.
In the suspect class area, a rule limiting Congress's authority to
remedying actual violations of Section 1 would still leave Congress
with the authority to enact legislation prohibiting conduct that would
be unconstitutional under strict scrutiny review. In Kimel, the Court
suggested that broad restrictions on discrimination can be enacted for
groups entitled to heightened scrutiny.210 In the nonsuspect class area,
209. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 968-69 (2001)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
210. "The Act, through its broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor,
prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be
held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard." Kimel,
528 U.S. at 86. By implication, such broad restrictions would be permissible if the applicable
standard were heightened scrutiny.
The Court was careful to distinguish its holding about the ADEA from possible applica-
tion to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Hence, the Court said: "Age classifications,
unlike governmental conduct based on race or gender, cannot be characterized as 'so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such con-
siderations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.' " Id. at 83. It is also helpful to
remember that the Kimel decision was written by Justice O'Connor, who has been a strong
supporter of equality rights for women in her decisions as a member of the Court. See, e.g.,
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however, such a rule would preclude Congress from enacting prophy-
lactic legislation subjecting the States to private damages actions, be-
cause it is hard to imagine that Congress could enact legislation that
did no more than bar conduct already unconstitutional under rational
basis review. In the few instances where the Court has struck down
legislation under rational basis review, it has written fact-intensive de-
cisions that emphasize the evidence of animus and irrationality in the
record.E" Those types of decisions are not well suited to legislative
rulemaking; they are best decided on a case by case basis in the judi-
cial arena under a constitutional law standard.
The above interpretation of Kimel would have substantial ramifi-
cations. Not only would Congress lack the power to authorize private
damages actions against the States pursuant to the Commerce Clause
following Seminole Tribe, but it would have comparably diminished
authority to regulate the States pursuant to Section 5, except when
protecting groups or enforcing rights entitled to heightened scrutiny
under Section 1. On this reading of Kimel, Congress would be wasting
its time if it tried to re-enact recently invalidated legislation by holding
more hearings and narrowing the scope of statutory coverage.
Congress might as well leave these problems to the courts under ra-
tional basis review.
B. Morrison
The phantom aspect to the decision in Morrison is more apparent
than in Kimel, because the Court is relatively clear in transforming a
question of fact (for Congress's determination) into a question of law
(for the Court's determination) while giving lip service to the notion
that it might defer to Congress's findings. The Court in Morrison
strongly suggested that Congress lacks the authority to enact any
"noneconomic" legislation under the Commerce Clause. Congress
does not have this authority because the Court has reshaped the "sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce" test from Lopez to mean that,
irrespective of the record compiled, Congress's legislative authority
under the Commerce Clause does not include the power to enact
noneconomic legislation.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
211. For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432(1985), the Court was influenced by direct evidence of animus against individuals with men-
tal retardation. Similarly, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court was influenced
by evidence of animus against gay men and lesbians that purportedly motivated the state-
wide initiative. Nonetheless, the Garrett Court questioned whether evidence of "mere nega-
tive attitudes or fear" is enough to demonstrate a constitutional violation for a nonsuspect
class. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964.
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In retrospect, one can see how the Court in Lopez was beginning
to draw a distinction between the regulation of economic and non-
economic activity. For example, the Court rationalized its earlier deci-
sion in Wickard v. Filburn212 by noting that although Filburn "is per-
haps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority
over intrastate activity," it is distinguishable from Lopez because it
"involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a
school zone does not. ' 213 The Court also hinted that the determination
of whether a statute regulates economic activity can be made through
an examination of the plain language of the statute rather than
through an assessment of the legislative record.214 In other words, this
determination could be made by the Court rather than by Congress.2 5
In Morrison, the Court signaled even more strongly that activity
must be economic to be regulated under the Commerce Clause, and
that whether the activity was economic was for the Court to deter-
mine. It stated that Congress may not legislate in the areas of "non-
economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's ag-
gregate effect on interstate commerce, '"216 irrespective of how much
legislative history it compiles. Similarly, the Court suggested that
Congress may not regulate under the Commerce Clause in the areas of
family law, marriage, divorce, and child rearing.1 7 In other words, the
Court countenanced the possibility that Congress could gather evi-
dence demonstrating that "noneconomic" activity has a substantial ef-
fect on commerce but then concluded that no amount of legislative
factfinding on the part of Congress could satisfy the Court's stan-
dards.218 It transformed the Commerce Clause test into a question of
212. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
213. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
214. The Court stated:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. Second
922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regula-
tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, there-
fore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially af-
fects interstate commerce.
Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
215. Nonetheless, the Lopez decision was equivocal on this issue, because the Court
then proceeded to examine whether the statute contained a jurisdictional element of an in-
terstate commerce requirement and whether the legislative record demonstrated an effect
on interstate commerce. Id. at 561-63.
216. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). The Court referenced the im-
proper Congressional regulation of criminal conduct in Morrison even though the provision
at issue was a civil remedy provision.
217. Id. at 615-16.
218. These possible exclusions might all be advanced as plausible under a reinvigorated
Tenth Amendment. (The Eleventh Amendment is not relevant to the decision in Morrison,
because Brzonkala was suing only private parties in the part of the lawsuit reviewed by the
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law rather than a question of fact with the following statement:
"Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them
is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be
settled finally only by this Court."219 The Court could simply look at
the subject matter which was being regulated and decide for itself
whether the subject matter was economic in character, harking back to
the days when the Court used to conclude that only certain industries
could be regulated under the Commerce Clause.
C. Implications
The implications of the emerging phantom methodology are sub-
stantial. In separation of powers terms, Congress's powers under Sec-
tion 5 and the Commerce Clause have been seriously eroded. Indeed,
the Court has withdrawn more power from Congress than it was able
to achieve under the short-lived National League of Cities standard.
1. Section 5
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a constitutional provi-
sion that explicitly grants power to Congress to regulate the States.
Whereas Section 1 acts negatively upon the States and inherently
grants authority to the judiciary to monitor compliance with those
limitations, Section 5 grants authority to Congress. Because the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified in an era of distrust of both the States
and the judiciary, the historical evidence suggests that the framers of
Section 5 did not intend to limit the scope of Congress's powers to
situations that the judiciary had already declared a violation of Section
1.220 Even if one does not accept this historical evidence, the text of the
Supreme Court.) The Court, however, reached its conclusions in Morrison by revamping the
meaning of the term "commerce" and how Congress can establish that activity has a substan-
tial effect on commerce.
219. Id. at 614, quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2. (1995) (quoting Justice Black's con-
currence in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964)). Al-
though the statement from Lopez was a quotation from Justice Black's concurrence in Heart
of Atlanta Motel, the Court's reliance is wholly inapt. Justice Black made his statement in
the context of trying to determine whether Title 1I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which he
had already concluded was facially constitutional, could be constitutionally applied against
the defendants in the particular case under review. The Heart of Atlanta Motel had argued
that Title II could not constitutionally reach its activities, because those activities were intra-
state in nature. The "as applied" aspect to the lawsuit, Justice Black explained, was a judicial
rather than a legislative question. Justice Black, however, clearly recognized Congress's im-
portant policy role in deciding what activities to regulate under the Commerce Clause. As he
stated in the phrase preceding the quotation: "The choice of policy is of course within the
exclusive power of Congress." Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J., concur-
ring). The current Court, by contrast, seems prepared to take those policy choices away from
Congress by shrinking the scope of the Commerce Clause.
220. For further discussion of this argument, see Colker, supra note 96, at 663.
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Fourteenth Amendment clearly calls for a different role for the States
and Congress. The effect of the Court's recent Section 5 jurispru-
dence, however, may be to eradicate Congress's distinctive Section 5
role by limiting it to banning conduct that the courts would otherwise
declare unconstitutional. No amount of factfinding by Congress seems
sufficient to give it authority to determine what prophylactic measures
are needed to guarantee the equal protection of the laws.
With its decision in Kimel, the Court effectively invited challenges
to core civil rights legislation, and states are lining up to claim addi-
tional Eleventh Amendment immunities. The Garrett decision now
precludes private employment discrimination actions for monetary
damages against states under ADA Title I. One can expect future
challenges to private actions for monetary damages against the States
under ADA Title II.21 In addition, the constitutionality of abrogation
under the Equal Pay Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA") is being litigated in the lower courts.222 Congress's Section
5 authority under the Equal Pay Act was recently upheld by the Elev-
enth Circuit as a congruent and proportional response to the problem
of wage discrimination.223 Although the Court acknowledged that
Congress had made no findings with respect to wage discrimination in
the public sector, it opined that "such [absence of] findings [is] not fa-
tal because gender discrimination is a problem of national import." '224
Congress, of course, thought that age discrimination and disability dis-
crimination were also problems of national import, but the courts of
appeals may be forgiven for absorbing from Kimel and Garrett the
teaching that the judiciary alone should decide which forms of status
discrimination engaged in by state employers are important enough to
warrant Section 5 protection.
While the Equal Pay Act has fared well in the lower courts,225 the
FMLA has not. Six circuits and a number of district courts have con-
221. Prior to Kimel and Garrett, two circuits had held that Congress exceeded its Section
5 enforcement powers when it enacted ADA Title II, which prohibits discrimination in the
services, programs or activities of a public entity. See Alsbrook v. City of Moumelle, 184 F.3d
999, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698,
703-07 (4th Cir. 1999). The Garrett Court expressly declined to reach this issue. See Bd. of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 960 n.1 (2001).
222. For further discussion, see Brian Ray, Note, "Out the Window?": Prospects for the
EPA and FMLA After Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1755 (2001).
223. Hundertmark v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2000).
224. See id. at 1276. The Seventh Circuit also issued a post-Kimel decision upholding
Congress's Section 5 authority under the Equal Pay Act. Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d
927 (7th Cir. 2000), cert denied 121 S. Ct. 2241 (2001). That court likewise downplayed the
absence of legislative findings involving wage discrimination by state employers, because
"the historical record clearly demonstrates that gender discrimination is a problem that is
national in scope." Id. at 935.
225. Apart from Hundertmark and Varner, see Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d
806 (6th Cir. 2000). Lower court cases upholding the Equal Pay Act that were decided after
Boerne but before Kimel include O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 1999);
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cluded that application of the FMLA to the States exceeded
Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5; many of these cases
have been decided since Kimel.216 These recent cases found a lack of
congruence and proportionality based in part on Congress's failure to
identify "widespread and pervasive evidence of gender-based leave
discrimination in the workplace." '27 One should expect the Supreme
Court in the next several years to rule on the constitutionality of abro-
gating states' immunity under each of these civil rights statutes and
perhaps under the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII as
well.
2. Commerce Clause
The long-term Commerce Clause implications of the Morrison de-
cision are not entirely clear. Defendants are currently challenging the
constitutionality of criminal laws that purportedly regulate non-
economic behavior. The Sixth Circuit recently concluded that the
Hobbs Act, which makes it a federal crime to engage in robbery or ex-
tortion affecting interstate commerce, could not reach the actions of
an individual who stole the receipts of a restaurant's business from the
home of the restaurant owner.228 Citing the language from Morrison
regarding the need for a distinction between what is "truly national
and what is truly local," the court found that "upholding federal juris-
diction over [the defendant's] offense would, in essence, acknowledge
a general federal police power with respect to the crimes of robbery
and extortion. '229 By interpreting the statute to require a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, even without a rigorous jurisdictional
provision, the Sixth Circuit avoided invalidating the statute as uncon-
Anderson v. State University of New York, 169 F.3d 117, 118 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated, 120 S.
Ct. 929 (2000); and Ussery v. State of Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1998). It is worth
noting that the circuits heavily favored the validity of ADEA abrogation during this pre-
Kimel period as well. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the ADA's abrogation of
sovereign immunity was constitutional, a position rejected in Garrett. See Garrett v. Bd. of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 193 F.3d 1214,1218 (11th Cir. 1999).
226. See Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001); Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61
(2d Cir. 2000); Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000); Kazmier v.
Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000); Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d
223 (3d Cir. 2000); Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 2000); Philbrick v. Univ. of
Conn., 90 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Ct. 2000). For pre-Kimel decisions invalidating FMLA abroga-
tion, see, for example, Kilvitis v. County of Lozerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408, 419 (M.D. Pa.
1999); McGregor v. Goord, 18 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Thomson v. Ohio State
Univ. Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
227. Philbrick, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 201; see Hale, 219 F.3d at 68-69; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at
528-29; Chittister, 226 F.3d at 228-29.
228. United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000).
229. Id. at 240.
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stitutional.2 ° Lower courts are examining other federal statutes to de-
termine if they require a sufficient effect on interstate commerce as a
jurisdictional element.231
Congress is searching for ways to get around the Morrison deci-
sion. It seems to have given up on the possibility of holding sufficient
hearings for legislation to pass muster under the new Commerce
Clause standard. Instead, it is seeking to amend federal criminal laws
to contain an explicit jurisdictional element. It has already amended
the Gun-Free School Zones law to include a jurisdictional element.232
A bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives which
would provide a jurisdictional element to the Violence Against
Women Act.233
Although this turn of events may enable Congress to continue to
exercise its authority under the Commerce Clause, there is an unfor-
tunate price for our system of government. A distinctive strength of
the legislative branch is the ability to think on a broad policy level
about problems of national concern and to hold wide-ranging hearings
to learn more about these problems. The increased tendency over the
last two hundred years for Congress to hold hearings is an encouraging
development, made possible largely by improvements in transporta-
tion and technology. In reviewing constitutionality under the Com-
230. The Hobbs Act criminalizes certain conduct that "obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce" and does not use the adverb "substantially" to modify "affects." See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a). Although the Sixth Circuit had consistently permitted the effect on commerce to
be de minimis when the criminal acts were directed at businesses, see, e.g., United States v.
Valenzeno, 123 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1997), it declined to apply such a low jurisdictional
prerequisite to criminal acts directed at private citizens, Wang, 222 F.3d at 239.
231. The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 ("CSRA"), has come
under attack as exceeding Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. Until it was
amended in 1998, the Act made it a criminal offense, punishable by up to two years' impris-
onment, "willfully [to] fail[] to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who
resides in another State." 18 U.S.C. § 228 (a) (1994). In a decision recently reversed en banc,
the Sixth Circuit panel found the CSRA unconstitutionally overinclusive because "it predi-
cates criminal jurisdiction not on flight across state lines, but on simple diversity of resi-
dence." United States v. Faase, 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd en banc 2001 WL 1058237
(6th Cir. Sept. 14, 2001). In 1998, CSRA was amended by the Deadbeat Parents Punishment
Act to require as a prerequisite to jurisdiction that an individual have traveled in interstate
commerce with the intent to evade a support obligation. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (a)(2) (2000). In a
case involving prosecutions under both the 1992 and 1998 versions of CSRA, a trial court in
the Second Circuit concluded that the Act violated Congress's authority under the Com-
merce Clause. United States v. King, 2001 WL 111278, No. S1 00 CR. 653 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 8, 2001). This decision relied heavily on the reasoning in the Faase panel decision and
was inconsistent with the Second Circuit's own precedent. See United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d
101 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding CSRA as within Congress's authority).
232. See Pub. L. 104-208, § 101(f) (1996) (amending § 657 to substitute "discharge a fire-
arm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place"
for "discharge a firearm at a place").
233. See H.R. 429, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) (Violence Against Women Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 2001) (introduced by Rep. Conyers on February 6, 2001, and co-
sponsored by eighty-nine members of Congress).
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merce Clause, however, the Court is sending Congress the message
simply to focus on whether the text explicitly demonstrates that an ac-
tivity is economic in nature and involves interstate commerce. Simi-
larly, in the Section 5 area, Congress should not even bother to con-
sider remedial legislation for groups not historically accorded
heightened scrutiny.
3. Circumventing Garcia
When the Supreme Court decided Garcia in 1985, then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist's forecast was clear: " I do not think it incumbent on
those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle
that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a ma-
jority of this Court. ' 34 Justice O'Connor's dissent stated somewhat
less boldly: "I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in
time again assume its constitutional responsibility. 23
5
At the time those predictions were penned, most observers
thought that the Court intended again to revisit its Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence and return to a standard similar to that set forth in
National League of Cities. Instead, it has relied on the Eleventh
Amendment and the Commerce Clause, directly withdrawing power
from Congress without necessarily handing it to the States. The simi-
larity in rhetoric between National League of Cities and Morrison is
striking. But the Court's new strategy has permitted further intrusions
into Congress's powers than would a return to the National League of
Cities standard under the Tenth Amendment.
In National League of Cities, the Court stated that Congress "may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system." '236 In order to
determine whether such inappropriate action was taking place, the
Court focused on whether the federal law was interfering with a fun-
damental attribute of state sovereignty.237 The Court was faced with
the question whether the extension of the minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour protections to state employees who worked in jobs such as
fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health and parks
and recreation violated the Tenth Amendment. Ruling for the States,
234. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
236. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976).
237. See id. at 845-46 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868)
("The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these determinations are 'functions
essential to separate and independent existence,' . . . so that Congress may not abrogate the
States' otherwise plenary authority to make them.")). In prior decisions, the Court had ob-
served that Congress could not, for example, determine where a state should "locate its own
seat of government." Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)).
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the Court found that direct regulation of the hours and compensation
of these state employees involved a "forced relinquishment of impor-
tant governmental activities, '238 thereby interfering with "traditional
aspects of state sovereignty. ,239 The National League of Cities decision
seemingly required future courts to distinguish between situations in
which Congress was and was not regulating traditional aspects of state
sovereignty. As we discussed in Part I, however, National League of
Cities had a minimal effect on the law. Although the decision created a
traditional/nontraditional state function distinction, few activities ap-
peared to fit on the "traditional" side of the ledger. 4°
The Lopez decision in effect signaled a reconfiguration of the dis-
tinction between traditional and nontraditional state functions. The
Justice Department had argued that it could regulate firearms in a lo-
cal school zone, because preventing crime can have an impact on the
nation's economic well-being. The Court responded:
[U]nder the Government's 'national productivity' reasoning, Congress
could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic pro-
ductivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce,
and child custody), for example. Under the theories that the Government
presents in support of section 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limita-
tion on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or
education where States historically have been sovereign. 241
Scholars were relatively muted as to the importance of Lopez
when it was decided. 42 The Morrison decision, however, revealed that
Lopez effectively created what National League of Cities could not -
a traditional state function test that the Court was willing to apply in
future cases. Seizing on the language from Lopez in which the Court
suggested that Congress may not regulate traditional state functions
under the Commerce Clause, the Court stated: "We accordingly reject
the argument that Congress may regulate non-economic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on in-
terstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local.
243
This decision could not directly overrule Garcia, because the
FLSA - the statute at issue in Garcia - was clearly of an economic
238. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 847.
239. Id. at 849.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
241. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
242. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 79, at 141 (anticipating - in a postscript to his 1994
lectures on federalism - that "the impact of the [Lopez] decision on broader questions of
federal power will be limited"); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674,
676 (1995) (describing the Lopez decision as imposing only a "minor restraint on congres-
sional power").
243. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000).
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character. But there was less need to overrule Garcia directly, because
the Court in the previous Term had already invalidated the applica-
tion of the FLSA to damage suits by private parties against the
States.244 The Morrison decision, however, did allow the Court to
withdraw Congress's power in areas that are both "noneconomic" and
"traditional state functions." Future courts will have to wrestle with
both of these standards.
While the traditional/nontraditional distinction proved elusive to
the Court in an earlier era, this Court may be more willing to police a
similar distinction through an economic/noneconomic test. We have
yet to see whether even more calibrated legislative factfinding or new
jurisdictional elements will allow Congress to continue to find ways to
legislate in these areas. What the Morrison decision and its progeny
may reveal is that a standard akin to the traditional/nontraditional
state function test can be a workable distinction for a Court deter-
mined to withdraw authority from Congress.
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
A. Legislative History in Two Settings
We have identified two somewhat contradictory trends that can be
seen in the Rehnquist Court's most recent decisions. On the one hand,
the Court is suggesting that it is quite interested in examining the leg-
islative record in the Commerce Clause and Section 5 contexts, al-
though it wants Congress to amass more detailed documentary sup-
port under an evolving constitutional law standard. On the other hand,
the Court is suggesting that it should make critical jurisdictional de-
terminations and that no amount of factfinding by Congress will affect
its analysis of these legal questions. Both of these themes can be seen
in the same cases, suggesting that the Court is still sorting out for itself
which mode of analysis is the most appropriate.
These seemingly conflicting approaches can perhaps be better un-
derstood if one also examines the same Court's approach to legislative
history in a pure statutory review setting. Key members of the new ac-
tivist majority have expressed a persistent lack of faith in the reliability
of legislative history when construing the meaning of federal stat-
utes.245 This hostility stems from a belief that such history is at best un-
244. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
245. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia J., concurring) ("It is
neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and ef-
fective application of the statutes of the United States, nor conducive to a genuine effectua-
tion of congressional intent, to give legislative force to each snippet of analysis, and even
every case citation, in committee reports that are increasingly unreliable evidence of what
the voting Members of Congress actually had in mind."); Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank &
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representative of the Congress as a whole and at worst susceptible to
strategic or insincere manipulation by its drafters.246 Justices Scalia and
Thomas, the leading textualists on the Court, have been especially
emphatic in contending that courts should not view committee reports,
hearing testimony, or floor debate as informative for members in gen-
eral, much less as reflective of an institutional understanding as to the
basis for particular legislation.247
Spurred by these textualist reservations, the Court in the 1990s has
become more focused on parsing the literal terms of each statute while
minimizing the role of legislative intent. 24 By the mid 1990s, the Court
was invoking legislative history in statutory cases far less often than it
had a decade earlier. 49 This decline in use persisted through the late
1990s, particularly in opinions authored by the very Justices who have
identified the importance of the legislative record when reviewing the
constitutionality of Congress's work.250
Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279-81 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to "the fairyland in
which legislative history reflects what was in Congress's mind" and dismissing it as "fiction of
Jack-in-the-Beanstalk proportions to assume that more than a handful of... members...
were.., aware of the drafting evolution that the Court describes"); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 462 n.2 (1999) (Thomas, J. and Scalia,
J., concurring) (observing that "the history of rejected legislative proposals... is irrelevant
for the simple reason that Congress enacted the Code, not the legislative history predating
it"). In each of these quotations, the focus is on the reliability of legislative history as re-
flecting institutional preferences or understandings, not the constitutional legitimacy of a
court's invoking it. See also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994)
(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (rejecting Court's
use of legislative history as a tool for interpreting Mine Safety and Health Act); Negonsott v.
Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 100 n.** (1993) (Justices Scalia and Thomas rejecting the Court's use
of legislative history as a tool for interpreting the Kansas Act); Pub. Citizen v. United States
Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-73 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (re-
jecting Court's use of legislative history as a tool for interpreting Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act).
246. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997). See generally Brudney, supra note 184, at 47-56; William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640-49, 651-53 (1990); Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Congress Is a "They" Not an "I": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON.
239 (1992).
247. See supra notes 245-246.
248. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doc-
trine, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 351 (1994); Richard J. Pierce, New Hypertextualism: An Invitation
to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995).
249. See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Su-
preme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 212-220; Patricia M. Wald, Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990).
250. Professor Tiefer deftly discusses seventeen opinions since 1995 in which legislative
history has been invoked by the majority over objections from Justices Scalia and Thomas.
See Tiefer, supra note 249. Although we agree with Professor Tiefer that legislative history
was important in those opinions, we are not persuaded that they signify a trend toward in-
creased use of legislative history. Almost all of the seventeen cases discussed by Professor
Tiefer were authored by Justices Stevens, Souter, or Breyer - Justices who have expressed
comparable respect for Congress's record in the context of constitutional review. While not
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The disfavored status of legislative history in statutory interpreta-
tion is well illustrated in two relatively routine cases decided during
the 1999-2000 Term interpreting, respectively, the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act Amendments of 1985251 and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 ("RICO").252 Each statute was ac-
companied by a rich legislative record, cited by the Court in prior
opinions253 and invoked by the litigants in their briefs to the Court.54
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas's majority opinion in each case was no-
tably silent with respect to the legislative history, instead relying exclu-
sively on formal language arguments or analysis of the surrounding
common law 5
as rhetorically intense on this matter as Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy regularly join (and sometimes write) statutory majority opinions rejecting legisla-
tive history. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (O'Connor,
J., majority opinion) (holding that ADA legislative history should not be considered because
text is clear on its face, despite dissent's extensive reliance on that history); United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (declining to resort to legis-
lative history because of "straightforward statutory command," although court of appeals
and dissent invoked different aspects of that history); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121
S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (2001) (holding that Federal Arbitration Act legislative history should not
be considered because Court's conclusions were "directed by the text," although dissent in-
voked detailed discussion of that history; majority opinion by Justice Kennedy); Boggs v.
Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 869 (1997) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (deciding ERISA contro-
versy without reference to legislative history, although dissent relies in part on excerpts from
that history).
Of course, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy also rely on legislative history in some of
their statutory majority opinions, and the fact that Justices Scalia and Thomas on occasion
join those opinions serves as a reminder that principled methodological stances have their
limits. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000) (O'Connor opinion holding FDA lacks authority to regulate tobacco products as cus-
tomarily marketed, and relying heavily on legislative history; Scalia and Thomas join major-
ity).
In any event, we have shown that two arguably conflicting strains can be found in the
Court's recent constitutional opinions: one creates a greater role for legislative history in the
constitutional law context while the other suggests that Congress may have no proper role
whatsoever in determining the scope of its authority. It is too early to predict which of these
two trends will dominate the Court's methodology in the future (if one comes to predomi-
nate at all).
251. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (determining whether em-
ployer's compensatory time policy violated the FLSA).
252. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000) (determining the meaning of the phrase
"injured ... by reason of" a "conspiracy").
253. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242, 245-48 (1989) (rely-
ing on legislative history to support a broad construction of RICO provisions); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486-93 (1985) (same); Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23-29 (1983) (same); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87, 591-93 (1981)
(same); Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 26-27 (1989) (closely reviewing legislative his-
tory of 1985 FLSA amendments).
254. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Christensen, 1999 WL 1204475, at **9-10, *29; Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Christensen, 1999 WL 1128266, at **12-13, *17;
Brief for Petitioner, Beck, 1999 WL 543861, at *32, *34, *37.
255. In Christensen, the Court relied on formal language arguments and refused to defer
to an Opinion Letter by the Department of Labor that supported the petitioner's position.
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How does one reconcile this disdain for legislative history in the
statutory setting with the emphasis on legislative history's importance
by many of the same Justices when assessing congressional enactments
under the Commerce Clause and Section 5? The new textualists, espe-
cially Justice Scalia, have explained that they are wary of legislative
history in the statutory context because "it is much more likely to pro-
duce a false or contrived legislative intent than a genuine one. 2 56 In
the instant constitutional law setting, these Justices have found it more
difficult to disavow record evidence regarding legislative intent. Ironi-
cally, however, their reliance on the legislative record in search of jus-
tifications for congressional action is susceptible to some of the same
abuses as they perceive in the pure statutory setting.257 With the
Court's new requirements, as amplified in the recent Garrett decision,
that Congress act as a quasi-judicial entity and marshall evidence of
arguable constitutional law violations by the States in the Section 5
context, the Court is effectively requiring Congress to adopt a more
strategic posture. Rather than perform as neutral gatherers of the
facts, Congressional committees must become advocates, culling the
almost limitless record of state conduct to focus on incidents and prac-
tices that have the greatest potential for establishing unconstitutional
intent.
529 U.S. at 582-88. No reference whatsoever was made to the legislative history. In Beck,
Justice Thomas interpreted the phrase "injured by reason of a conspiracy" by looking exclu-
sively to the common-law of civil conspiracy. 529 U.S. at 500-01 (quoting Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)) (justifying that theory of interpretation by stating
that when Congress uses language with a settled meaning at common law the Court pre-
sumes that Congress "knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor-
rowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.., unless otherwise in-
structed"). It is a mark of how textualist norms now set the standard that the dissent in each
case addressed only the majority's own reasoning; there were no references at all to legisla-
tive history. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 592-96 (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissent-
ing) (disputing majority's refusal to defer to Department of Labor but never discussing leg-
islative history); Beck, 529 U.S. at 508-12 (Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting) (disputing
majority's interpretation of the common law and referring instead to the "plain language" of
the statute). For discussion of how the legislative history accompanying these two statutes
might have influenced judicial analyses and outcomes, see Brudney, supra note 135, at 184-
85, 199.
256. SCALIA, supra note 246, at 32. The textualists also want to send Congress a message
that it should draft statutory language with greater care and precision and not use legislative
history as a means to avoid or finesse politically contentious matters. Increased attention to
the clarity of text will, in their view, offer clearer guidance to the executive and judicial
branches than reliance on legislative history. See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS
AND CONGRESS 60 (1997); Brudney, supra note 184, at 16.
257. The Court's severest critics of legislative history accompanying statutes, Justices
Scalia and Thomas, have relied extensively on The Federalist and on debating history that
accompanies constitutional text. For a thoughtful discussion of the problems with this posi-
tion, see William N. Eskridge Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not
Statutory Legislative History? 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301 (1998). The legislative history at
issue here is neither purely statutory nor purely constitutional: rather, it involves the consti-
tutionality of a statutory product.
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Even for those who reject Justice Scalia's conception of legislative
history as systemically strategic or unreliable,258 this new role for
Congress is troubling. Factfinding in the legislative arena differs in its
procedures and objectives from factfinding in the courts. Congress
collects evidence and builds a record in an effort to consider broad
policy issues and formulate appropriately general responses, not to
adjudicate discrete matters of individual justice. Transforming this in-
formation-gathering process into a kind of judicial branch activity in-
vites strategic behavior that diminishes Congress as a lawmaking body.
Still, to understand why the Rehnquist Court has encouraged such
heavy reliance on legislative record building as part of its new juris-
prudence under the Commerce Clause and Section 5, it is helpful to
recognize the limited nature of the options available to the Court.
When faced with the question of determining the proper scope of
Congressional authority, the Justices essentially have three choices
available. First, they can defer to Congress to delineate the proper
scope of its own authority, so long as its determination is a reasonable
one. Second, they can construct a more rigorous test under which the
Court would allow Congress to define the scope of its authority but
review that determination with care. Because Congress need not ar-
ticulate the authority for its action in the legislation itself, the only
place to look for Congress's understanding of its authority would be in
the legislative history of the statute. Third, they can determine the
proper scope of Congress's authority for themselves and give Congress
no role in making that determination.
From the New Deal era until 1995, the Court basically adopted the
first perspective. It presumed the constitutionality of Congress's ac-
tions but sometimes perused the legislative history for evidence of rea-
sonableness. Since 1995, one might describe the new activists as being
torn between the second and third perspectives. They have found
themselves reluctantly surveying the legislative history to determine
whether Congress had rigorously pronounced and justified its author-
ity to enact legislation." 9 But they also have made statements in favor
258. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 861-69 (1992) (responding to various criticisms of the use of legisla-
tive history); Brudney, supra note 184, at 40-66 (responding to constitutional and practical
arguments for devaluing legislative history); Eskridge, supra note 257, at 1310-19 (critiquing
textualist attacks on legislative history as exaggerated or misplaced).
259. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion for the Court in Lopez in which he
acknowledged that the Court should examine legislative history as a factor in its determina-
tion of constitutionality. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) ("Although as
part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of
course consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, re-
garding effect on interstate commerce ...."). Similarly, Justice Kennedy authored the opin-
ion for the Court in City of Boerne in which he examined the legislative record to determine
if RFRA constituted proper remedial, preventive legislation. See City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 529-33 (1997); see also Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federal-
ism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 799 (1996) (suggesting that federalism should be enforced by "po-
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of the third perspective, under which they can find legislative history
as irrelevant in the constitutional setting as they do in the statutory
context. From either perspective, the new activists' distinctly unsym-
pathetic approach toward legislative history in the Section 5 and
Commerce Clause settings comports with the views expressed by
many of the same Justices when resolving disputes over statutory
meaning.26
When one tries to reconcile the Court's attitudes regarding statu-
tory and constitutional interpretation, one can see that the new activ-
ists may be vacillating between the crystal ball and the phantom ap-
proaches in the constitutional setting. The crystal ball approach is
appealing because it is consistent with the traditional sense that some
deference toward Congress is appropriate. But the phantom approach
allows these justices explicitly to ignore legislative history in both the
constitutional and statutory settings, creating a form of judicial consis-
tency. As discussed above, however, this move greatly increases the
power of the judiciary at the expense of a coequal branch of govern-
ment.
B. Implications for Federalism
In addition to posing challenges with respect to judicial consis-
tency, the Rehnquist Court's emphasis on a certain type of legislative
record also raises troubling issues from a federalism perspective. The
problem is starkly presented in the recent Garrett decision. In that
case, Congress had created a task force to gather evidence from all
fifty States relative to the need for national legislation to protect indi-
viduals with disabilities. The Court found, however, that factfinding by
licing Congress's deliberative processes and its reasons for regulating"); supra note 167 (sur-
veying academics who contend that it is appropriate for Court to review congressional legis-
lative history as part of its inquiry under the Commerce Clause or Section 5).
260. Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's broad-based hostility to legislative history is
well documented. See, e.g., supra notes 245-246. Justice O'Connor often minimizes the value
of legislative history when interpreting the language of certain antidiscrimination statutes.
She refused to examine legislative history to determine whether the ADEA intended to
cover state court judges. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991) ("We will not
read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are in-
cluded. This does not mean that the Act must mention judges explicitly, although it does
not .... Rather, it must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it covers judges."). More
recently, she did not consider the legislative history of the Americans with Disabilities Act
relevant to determining whether Congress intended the term "disability" to include condi-
tions whose symptoms may be ameliorated through the use of mitigating measures. See
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Similarly, Justice Kennedy refused to
give weight to a key conference report when interpreting the term "subterfuge" under the
ADEA. See Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). Justice O'Connor
authored, and Justice Kennedy joined, the majority opinion in Kimel, in which the Court
skeptically assessed the ADEA's legislative history. See also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note
188 (arguing that the Court's treatment of legislative record in recent Section 5 and Com-
merce Clause cases reflects unacknowledged motives of congressional distrust).
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this task force documenting instances of discrimination was not suffi-
cient for Section 5 purposes, because Congress had not itself engaged
in the factfinding and the factfinding did not rise to the level of uncov-
ering what were clearly constitutional violations.
If future Congresses were to conform their conduct to Garrett, they
could try to conduct factfinding that would meet the Court's newly
crafted standard. Congress would presumably have to gather all the
information itself through its own committee hearings, without reli-
ance on state or local-level organizations or people who live in the
respective States to gather information themselves. Congress also
would have to insist that the testimony was so stark that the published
hearings could be tantamount to evidence usable in future constitu-
tional litigation against the States.26" ' Such a combative relationship be-
tween Congress and the States, however, is scarcely consistent with
the dignity deemed appropriate for state sovereignty2 6 and would cer-
tainly be destructive to our sense of national unity. Indeed, one of the
ironies of the Court's new jurisprudence is that in a post-Garcia world,
Congress is more reluctant than ever to treat states in confrontational
or adversarial terms. Yet without such an aggressive approach,
Congress is disabled from exercising its "appropriate" Fourteenth
Amendment power to hold states monetarily responsible for their un-
lawful discriminatory conduct.
Faced with this seemingly unpalatable option, Congress could de-
cide to use its remaining intact power - the Spending Clause - to
force states to consent to suits for money damages.2 63 This approach,
however, is also not without difficulties. To begin with, it may be im-
practical because the spending power has insufficient substantive limi-
tations to serve as a precise regulatory mechanism. Moreover, reliance
on the spending power may be such a blunderbuss approach that it
will effectively "commandeer" aspects of state government.2" It seems
261. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967 (2001) (re-
quiring Congress to document that there is a "pattern of discrimination by the States which
violates the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also id. at 969 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., con-
curring) (requiring there to be "documentation of patterns of constitutional violations com-
mitted by the State in its official capacity").
262. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 709 (1999) ("Federalism requires that Congress
accord States the respect and dignity due them as residuary sovereigns and joint participants
in the Nation's governance.").
263. See supra note 11 (discussing Spending Clause). The Senate Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions Committee recently approved a bill that would require states to abide
by the ADEA as a condition of receiving federal funds. See Daily Lab. Rep., Sept. 14, 2001,
at A-1 (discussing S.928).
264. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992), the Supreme Court stated
that Congress may not simply "commandeer [ I the legislative processes of the States by di-
rectly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." See supra note
79 (discussing New York v. United States). Professor Baker has argued that statutes should
be presumed to be unconstitutional under the Spending Clause if the statute cannot be char-
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far less preferable as a matter of comity for Congress to determine
that entire programs will cease to receive financial assistance if dis-
crete civil rights problems are not corrected than merely requiring the
States to compensate identified victims of discrimination for the injury
they suffered.265
Finally, Congress could greatly increase its funding of federal
agencies charged with enforcing the various laws that impose substan-
tive standards for the States to follow, in light of the fact that individu-
als will no longer be able to bring suits for money damages. This move,
however, would require a major shift from the broad federal legisla-
tive trend since the 1960s favoring private enforcement of civil rights
and related laws.266 In order to reduce the financial and substantive
concerns associated with reliance on prosecution by federal agencies,
Congress has crafted fee-shifting and compensatory damages provi-
sions that encourage private attorneys to bring cases on behalf of ag-
grieved individuals. A dramatic enlargement of the federal govern-
ment's enforcement role would create enormous fiscal burdens while
raising serious questions about the effectiveness of such an ap-
proach.267 Such a change also would threaten federalism values by
providing for a more aggressive and adversarial national government
presence in the fifty States.
acterized as "reimbursement spending" and Congress is seeking to use the Spending Clause
to engage in direct regulation that would otherwise be impermissible under New York v.
United States. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1963-64.
265. Compare section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (conditioning receipt of fed-
eral financial assistance on the provision of nondiscrimination on the basis of disability), with
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (creating private damages remedy for
victims of employment discrimination at state entities). Congress enacted section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, requiring nondiscrimination on the basis of disability in programs or ac-
tivities receiving federal financial assistance. Pub. L. 93-112, Title V, § 504, Sept. 26, 1973, 87
Stat. 394, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). This law was enacted pursuant to Congress's
spending powers. Although the Rehabilitation Act was controversial, and twice vetoed by
President Nixon when it was first passed by Congress, no one questioned the constitutional-
ity of Congress's authority to impose requirements on the States (and other entities) through
the spending power. See, e.g., The President's Memorandum of Disapproval, Oct. 27, 1972,
reported in 8 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 1577, 1579 (1972) (vetoing Rehabilitation Act be-
cause it was fiscally irresponsible and would jeopardize executive branch enforcement
goals).
266. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1021-22 (2000) (noting that presently under the
FLSA, private lawsuits outnumber civil actions brought by the United States by a 10:1 ratio).
267. See id. at 1022-23 (arguing that federal bureaucracies may respond far less rapidly
and flexibly than private attorneys to shifting demands for enforcement action, and that
"Congress may reasonably doubt that federal government resources are wisely used to pur-
sue litigation against state agencies when a private rightholder's interest is great but the
public interest may be small").
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CONCLUSION
Half a century ago, Justice Jackson dryly observed with respect to
himself and his colleagues: "We are not final because we are infallible,
but we are infallible only because we are final.""26 The Rehnquist
Court has in our view become excessively critical of Congress and the
fallibility of its lawmaking processes in recent Commerce Clause and
Section 5 decisions. Although the Court has often framed its invalida-
tion of federal laws in states' rights terms, we believe these invalida-
tions must also be understood as a threat to separation of powers.
The repeated abrogation of federal statutes - including statutes
expressly supported by the States themselves269 - has resulted in a
considerable transfer of power to the judiciary. Respect must be
earned, and it is easy to ridicule Congress by saying that it has not
earned this Court's good opinion. But ours is a system of government
in which Congress is expected to engage in broad-based thinking on
matters of concern to the nation. States are well able to protect their
own interests as participants in this national political process,27° and it
is neither necessary nor prudent for the Court to insist repeatedly on a
redistribution of authority at Congress's expense. In doing so, the cur-
rent Court has conveyed the message that Congress is suspect in the
powers it exercises and the manner in which it exercises them. That is
not a message we should countenance the Court sending to this or any
future Congress.
268. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
269. See supra notes 161, 176 (discussing widespread support for VAWA and ADA
from state officials and state-level organizations).
270. See supra Part II.C.3 and notes 161, 176 (noting that States were amply represented
and actively participated in various congressional enactments extending coverage). See gen-
erally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Larry Kramer, Un-
derstanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994).
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